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WHERE ONE MARKETPLACE CLOSES, 
(HOPEFULLY) ANOTHER WON’T OPEN:  
IN DEFENSE OF FOSTA 
Abstract: Since federal law first acknowledged the crime of sex trafficking in 
2000, the internet has exploded—and sex traffickers have taken note. Traffickers 
have gained a platform to sell their victims to a much larger audience and with 
greater ease. Posting victims’ advertisements online allows traffickers to drasti-
cally expand their customer base beyond the traditional street corner. Despite 
congressional attempts to criminalize sex traffickers and their beneficiaries since 
2000, the internet persists as an effective conduit for sex traffickers to find cus-
tomers. In 2018, Congress sought to remedy this by passing legislation that ex-
panded criminal and civil liability to websites that knowingly participate in sex 
trafficking by hosting sex trafficking advertisements. In part, the Allow States 
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) amends a law that was 
widely understood to provide websites with total immunity from claims arising 
out of third-party content. Concerned with the potential for criminal prosecu-
tions, internet service providers criticize FOSTA as an infringement on their First 
Amendment right to free speech. They argue that the law forces them to censor 
third-party users’ content and that it improperly extends to legal speech. The First 
Amendment generally does not restrict the content of speech, however, and its 
protections do not extend to speech that solicits crime. This Note will argue that 
FOSTA does not violate the First Amendment and is constitutionally sound at its 
core because sex traffickers’ advertisements solicit crime. 
INTRODUCTION 
When her daughter went missing, Jane Doe’s mother typed her cell phone 
number into Backpage.com (Backpage).1 The results page offered photographs 
of the young girl in various states of undress, one even taken in her bedroom.2 
Posted to Backpage’s “Escorts” section, Jane’s photographs included her cell 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Janelle Nanos, Her 15-year-old Daughter Fell Prey to a Sex Trafficker, BOS. GLOBE MAG. 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2017/02/01/her-year-old-daughter-fell-prey-
sex-trafficker/59fekHj6aaqhkCAh8eoVvL/story.html [https://perma.cc/39WT-2TM5]. After looking 
at her fifteen-year-old daughter’s phone records, Jane’s mother contacted unfamiliar numbers. Id. One 
responded that he had never met Jane but that he had received her number from the website Backpage. 
Id. For purposes of this Introduction, I refer to the victim as Jane Doe, reflecting the anonymity of the 
victim portrayed by both the Globe article (in calling her “Jane Doe”) and in court documents. Id.; see 
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2016) (referring to this particular 
victim as “Jane Doe #3” with respect to her fellow victims also bringing suit against Backpage.com). 
 2 Nanos, supra note 1. Although the photographs did not include Jane’s face, Jane’s mother rec-
ognized the little clothing that Jane was wearing and Jane’s bedroom. Id. 
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phone number and featured language that she was both inexperienced and in-
terested in meeting people.3 Eventually, Jane’s mother learned that a man kid-
napped Jane and posted the photographs as advertisements to sell her daughter 
for commercial sex acts.4 As is common with most sex traffickers, Jane’s per-
petrator developed a relationship with her over time before kidnapping her.5 
Soon after Jane’s trafficker posted the advertisements to Backpage, individuals 
began contacting Jane’s cell phone to arrange a time to meet.6 
Throughout the time that Jane’s trafficker held her against her will, Jane 
was raped multiple times by her trafficker’s customer base.7 Individuals re-
sponded to the Backpage advertisement and paid Jane’s trafficker in order to 
have sex with Jane.8 Even after Jane escaped her trafficker and her parents re-
quested that Backpage remove the advertisements, the photographs remained 
online for at least a week.9 Jane ultimately brought suit against Backpage, al-
leging that the website facilitated her sex trafficking by posting and refusing to 
edit “Escort” advertisements.10 Sex trafficking is the “recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person” for the sale of sex.11 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Doe ex. rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 153 (D. Mass. 2015) (relay-
ing that the Backpage advertisements of Jane included words such as, “new,” “sweet,” and “playful”); 
Nanos, supra note 1 (inferring that the advertisements conveyed that Jane was available to be pur-
chased for sex every night and that she was under the age of eighteen). 
 4 See Nanos, supra note 1 (noting that the man took photographs of Jane from Jane’s phone and 
used them to create the Backpage advertisement). 
 5 See id. (explaining that Jane met her trafficker on Facebook). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17 (finding that Jane’s multiple sexual assaults occurred due to 
the Backpage advertisement that her trafficker posted). The other victims who brought suit against 
Backpage with Jane were individually raped over nine hundred times during the two-year spans that 
their traffickers kept them. Id. The court notes that the traffickers posted some of the advertisements 
and compelled the victims to post other advertisements. Id. 
 8 See Nanos, supra note 1 (detailing that Jane’s trafficker received payment from customers in 
both money and drugs). After receiving payment, Jane’s trafficker often waited outside of the hotel 
room where men raped Jane. Id. 
 9 See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17 n.3 (noting that Jane’s parents’ requests did not immediately 
result in any removal). Jane’s trafficker was found guilty of human trafficking charges and sentenced 
to five to seven years in prison. Nanos, supra note 1. One of the men who paid Jane’s trafficker and 
assaulted Jane received no punishment because he assisted law enforcement. Id. 
 10 Reply Br. for the Appellants at 11, Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. Nov. 19, 2015) (No. 
15-1724), 2015 WL 7444084 (alleging that Backpage’s conduct amounted to the facilitation of sex 
trafficking). Specifically, Jane Doe alleges that Backpage’s willful blindness toward known sex traf-
ficking advertisements and profits garnered from traffickers who post the advertisements amount to 
Backpage profiting from sex trafficking. See id. (explaining that Backpage’s refusal to regulate known 
trafficking content allows them to continue to profit from advertisements). Additionally, Jane claims 
that Backpage aids traffickers in avoiding law enforcement detection because the site allows third-
party users to post content anonymously. See id. (describing how anonymous posts further facilitate 
sex trafficking). A Senate subcommittee report accused Backpage of editing its third-party advertise-
ments by deleting select language that traffickers used to signify an underage victim. See Annie Kelly, 
Small Ads Sex Trafficking: The Battle Against Backpage, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2017), https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jul/02/fight-for-my-daughter-battle-against-backpage-
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The act of sex trafficking, which victims like Jane endured, has a long his-
tory in the United States.12 The internet has contributed to its growth, allowing 
for traffickers like Jane’s to readily and quickly access a large customer base 
merely by posting photographs to websites.13 Due to sex trafficking’s continued 
proliferation, legislators have repeatedly attempted to hold more individuals ac-
countable.14 With the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 
in 2000, Congress created criminal liability for the specific crime of sex traffick-
ing.15 Eight years later, Congress reauthorized the TVPA and expanded it by ex-
tending culpability to individuals who benefitted from sex trafficking beyond the 
trafficker.16 Despite these legislative efforts, the internet continued to expand the 
marketplace for traffickers and customers.17 
                                                                                                                           
child-sex-trafficking [https://perma.cc/N622-RA7T] (describing Backpage’s efforts to delete words 
like “Lolita” from personal advertisements). 
 11 See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2018) (defining “sex trafficking”). 
 12 See id. § 7101(b)(1) (noting that sex trafficking has persisted into the modern era). Congress 
described human trafficking as a “modern form of slavery.” Id. 
 13 See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH CONG., BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING 
FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 5 (2017) [hereinafter BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FA-
CILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING] https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Backpage
%20Report%202017.01.10%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JVZ-PYJJ] (describing the relationship 
between the internet and growth of sex trafficking). In addition to increasing the efficiency of finding 
customers, the internet has also aided traffickers in avoiding law enforcement detection due to the 
anonymous nature of posts. Id. 
 14 See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN-TRAFFICKING CASES, 2015, 
at 2 (2018) (describing Congressional attempts to combat sex trafficking and providing data from 
2015 prosecutorial efforts). The report notes that federal sex trafficking legislation ultimately arises 
out of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. 
 15 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§ 102(b)(14), 114 Stat. 1464, 1467 (emphasizing the need for specific legislation to combat sex traf-
ficking). Congress noted that the then-existing statutes used to prosecute sex traffickers were inade-
quate because they only dealt with nonviolent offenses. Id. This resulted in traffickers receiving pun-
ishments that did not adequately reflect the extent of their culpability. Id. The TVPA sets a minimum 
of twenty years and a maximum of life imprisonment for any individual who sex traffics a minor. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018) (creating criminal liability for sex traffickers). If the victim was not a minor, 
then there is no minimum sentence and the maximum prison term is twenty years. See id. § 1590 (in-
creasing the maximum sentence to life imprisonment if the offense includes kidnapping, death, or 
aggravated sexual assault). 
 16 See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, § 222, 122 Stat. 5044, 5070 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1589) [hereinafter 
TVPA Reauthorization Act] (expanding criminal liability to individuals who conspired to commit sex 
trafficking). In addition to co-conspirators, criminal liability was also extended to individuals who 
profited from sex trafficking endeavors. See 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (making pecuniary gains from sex 
trafficking illegal).  
 17 See URBAN INST., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE UNDERGROUND COMMER-
CIAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR US CITIES 218 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/22376/413047-estimating-the-size-and-structure-of-the-underground-commercial-
sex-economy-in-eight-major-us-cities_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U47Q-64Z9] (describing how the inter-
net has changed the business model of the commercial sex trade). 
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In response to cases like Jane’s and websites like Backpage, Congress 
passed the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act 
(FOSTA).18 FOSTA seeks to shut down the online marketplace for the exploi-
tation of sex trafficked victims by extending criminal liability to websites that 
“knowingly facilitate” sex trafficking.19 Two days after FOSTA passed the 
Senate, Craigslist.com, a popular website for its personal advertisements, 
closed its entire classified section.20 Proponents of FOSTA celebrated this clo-
sure as a website finally taking responsibility for its bad acts and indicated that 
the bill’s passage would have a widespread effect.21 In contrast, the closure 
appeared to critics as proof of FOSTA’s impending threat towards revoking 
First Amendment protections.22 
This Note explores the tension between sex trafficking advertisements 
and the First Amendment in today’s internet era.23 Part I of the Note discusses 
the nature of sex trafficking and congressional efforts towards combatting it, 
including FOSTA’s attempt to address the role of the internet in sex traffick-
ing’s continued expansion.24 Part II reviews criticism of FOSTA, specifically 
internet service providers who are concerned with its effect on their First 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) of 2017, Pub. L. 
No. 115-164, § 3, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 
47 U.S.C.) (creating criminal liability for internet service providers involved in sex trafficking); H.R. 
REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 4 (2018) (citing the First Circuit’s decision in Jane’s case as contributing to 
the need for FOSTA). The First Circuit dismissed Jane’s claim against Backpage, citing the civil im-
munity for websites like Backpage with regards to content posted by third-parties, in this case Jane’s 
trafficker. See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 22 (finding that Backpage could not be held liable for the 
harm done to Jane by advertisements that her trafficker posted to Backpage). 
 19 See FOSTA § 5 (acknowledging the role that internet service providers have played in the 
ongoing sex trafficking trade). 
 20 See Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, FOSTA: The New Anti-Sex Trafficking Legislation May 
Not End the Internet, but It’s Not Good Law Either, LAWFARE (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/fosta-new-anti-sex-trafficking-legislation-may-not-end-internet-its-not-good-law-either 
[https://perma.cc/A76L-6VJD] (finding that Craigslist closed its intimate classifieds section in re-
sponse to FOSTA and out of fear of its increased civil liability under FOSTA). In addition to 
Craigslist, other websites also closed parts of their personal advertisement sections. See Nitasha Tiku, 
Craigslist Shuts Personal Ads for Fear of New Internet Law, WIRED (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.
wired.com/story/craigslist-shuts-personal-ads-for-fear-of-new-internet-law/?mbid=BottomRelated
Stories [https://perma.cc/SRV7-E9MF] (noting that Reddit shut down its subsections entitled, “Hook-
ers,” “Escorts,” and “SugarDaddy”). 
 21 See Bob Goodlatte (@RepGoodlatte), TWITTER (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://twitter.
com/RepGoodlatte/status/977237099089887232? [https://perma.cc/MG5H-37BA] (remarking, as the 
House Judiciary Committee chairman and co-sponsor of the bill, on websites recently closing their 
personal advertisements sections as a sign of FOSTA’s success). 
 22 See Elizabeth Nolan Brown, The New Law That Killed Craigslist’s Personals Could End the Web 
as We’ve Known It, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-new-law-that-
killed-craigslists-personals-could-end-the-web-as-weve-known-it [https://perma.cc/4GEG-RQNE] (not-
ing FOSTA’s potential violation of First Amendment as criminalizing speech relating to consensual sex). 
 23 See infra notes 27–237 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 27–136 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment protections.25 Part III argues that while FOSTA could benefit from 
more specific language, the law ultimately does not run afoul of any First 
Amendment violations.26 
I. SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE INTERNET ERA 
The illicit marketplace for sex trafficked victims has continued to grow, 
despite congressional attempts to limit its scope.27 The emergence of the inter-
net largely caused this expansion.28 The forced sale of individuals to perform 
sexual acts is not a new phenomenon in the United States.29 Nonetheless, the 
legislative solutions posed by Congress have changed over time.30 The reme-
dies have expanded the scope of liability as Congress recognized the wide 
range of individuals involved in the illicit trade.31 The most recent congres-
sional change, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act of 2017 (FOSTA), acknowledges the crucial role that the internet plays in 
traffickers’ business.32 This Part discusses the nature of sex trafficking, the role 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 137–200 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 201–237 and accompanying text. 
 27 See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH CONG., REC. TO ENFORCE A SUBPOE-
NA ISSUED TO CEO OF BACKPAGE.COM, LLC 4 (2015), http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/PSIReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9HU-FXR5] (describing the sex trafficking market as 
producing billions in profits for sex traffickers and their beneficiaries). 
 28 See Latest Developments in Combating Online Sex Trafficking: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Communications and Technology of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 115-84 
(2017) (statement by Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, The National Cen-
ter for Missing and Exploited Children) (detailing how the internet leads to a larger customer base and 
specifically noting the increased dangers for underage individuals). The internet allows for customers 
to search for commercial sex acts more easily and frequently. Id. Additionally, it allows for the com-
plete financial transaction to occur online, increasing efficiency and allowing anonymity. Id. 
 29 See Donna Hughes, Combating Sex Trafficking: A History, FAIR OBSERVER (Oct. 6, 2013), 
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/combating-sex-trafficking-history/ [https://perma.
cc/JN5Y-C2YS] (tracing the origins of sex trafficking in the United States to the 1800s). As the aboli-
tionist movement against slavery began to garner support in the later 1800s, individuals throughout 
the world also began taking note of women who were forced into prostitution. See id. The term “sex 
trafficking” did not emerge until the 1980s, when the women’s movement began defending prostitu-
tion as a form of employment and differentiating it from forced prostitution, i.e. sex trafficking. Id. 
 30 See ALEXANDRA F. LEVY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR., FEDERAL HUMAN TRAFFICK-
ING CIVIL LITIGATION: 15 YEARS OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 7 (2018) (providing an over-
view of Congressional responses to the issue of sex trafficking). Compare Mann Act (White-Slave 
Traffic Act), Pub. L. No. 2771, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421) (crimi-
nalizing the forced transportation of women across state lines), with FOSTA § 3 (holding websites 
criminally liable for participating in sex trafficking ventures). 
 31 Compare TVPA § 102(b)(2) (creating a specific crime for individuals who either directly par-
ticipate in the forced sale of commercial sex or profit in some way from such a sale), with FOSTA § 3 
(extending liability to websites that facilitate the forced sale of commercial sex). 
 32 See Elizabeth Dias, Trump Signs Bill Amid Momentum to Crack Down on Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/backpage-sex-trafficking.html [https://perma.
cc/P85Q-N97K] (describing FOSTA’s sponsors characterization of the bill). Specifically, FOSTA co-
2480 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2475 
that the internet has played in expanding its illicit market, and FOSTA’s at-
tempt to combat online advertisements.33 
A. The Scope of the Problem 
1. Understanding Sex Trafficking 
Estimates indicate that global human trafficking produces billions of dol-
lars annually for those involved in the trade.34 In the United States, human traf-
ficking takes the form of forced farming, household, manufacturing, and sexu-
al labor.35 Sex trafficking, a specific form of human trafficking, is the illegal 
trade of humans against their will and for performance of commercial sexual 
acts.36 In the United States, sex trafficking is defined as the inducement of a 
commercial sex act either by “force, fraud, or coercion,” or if the individual is 
younger than eighteen.37 The act of sex trafficking extends beyond the sole 
individual who arranges for the transaction and subsequent sexual act to occur; 
                                                                                                                           
sponsor Representative Ann Wagner referenced the multitude of websites that would now be held 
accountable for their role in sex trafficking under FOSTA. Id. 
 33 See infra notes 34–136 and accompanying text. 
 34 What Is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: BLUE CAMPAIGN https://www.
dhs.gov/blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/Y5WA-2656]; see G.A. Res. 55/25, 
at 2, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Chil-
dren (Nov. 15, 2000) (creating the first international definition of human trafficking). The United 
Nations defines “trafficking in persons” as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force . . . for the purpose of exploitation.” Id. The 
United States ratified the Protocol in 2005. See UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF TREATIES https://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&clang=
_en [https://perma.cc/2KH9-ARES] (listing the date of ratification). Of the highest earning interna-
tional crimes, human trafficking is considered second only to drug trafficking. U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC., supra. 
 35 See SIDDHARTH KARA, SEX TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN SLAVERY 183 
(2017) (discussing the industries where human trafficking occurs in the United States). The number of 
overall sex trafficking victims brought to the U.S. accounts for roughly 0.9% of the international total 
of victims. Id. The book’s author credits three factors for the relatively small amount of human traf-
ficking that occurs in the United States compared to other nations: the expensive travel between the 
United States and the victims’ home countries (mostly Eastern Europe and East Asia), the more effi-
cient and just American law enforcement and judicial systems in place, and the passage of the TVPA 
in 2000, leading to more prosecutorial efforts. See id. (providing the factors that differentiate the 
American sex trafficking trade from the global sex trafficking trade). Nonetheless, international vic-
tims still account for roughly one-third of the sex trafficking trade in the United States. See NAT’L 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING RES. CTR., 2013 STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 7 (2014) (providing data for incom-
ing calls from self-reporting victims and finding that 32% identified themselves as foreigners to the 
U.S., 37% identified as U.S. citizens, and the rest did not provide country of origin). 
 36 See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(12) (defining sex trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transporta-
tion, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex 
act”). Congress defines “commercial sex act” as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is 
given to or received by any person.” Id. § 7102(4). 
 37 See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (defining the two types of conduct that rise to the level of sex traffick-
ing). 
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anyone who transports victims or otherwise enlists victims can also be held 
responsible.38 
Sex trafficking victims often share a set of characteristics.39 As a matter of 
law, sex trafficking victims are either under the age of eighteen or are over the 
age of eighteen and forced into commercial sex.40 As of 2018, roughly twenty-
five percent of sex trafficking victims in North America are thought to be un-
derage.41 Women and children represent the largest demographic of victims.42 
Sex traffickers often prey on urban communities with high immigrant popula-
tions.43 Aside from domestic efforts, traffickers also ensnare individuals from 
Eastern Asia, particularly Thailand and the Philippines.44 Brought to the United 
States under false pretenses, these victims are particularly vulnerable to the 
fear tactics used by traffickers.45 
Sex traffickers employ multiple techniques to trap victims, however, the 
most common method employed is “grooming” the victim.46 This involves 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 See The Victims & Traffickers, POLARIS, https://polarisproject.org/victims-traffickers [https://
perma.cc/MT62-AKV7] (explaining that there is no singular set of traits for sex trafficking victims but 
that certain factors make individuals in situations more prone to traffickers’ advances). 
 40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (distinguishing between minors and adults for purposes of sex trafficking 
law). Individuals under eighteen are victims of sex trafficking regardless of whether there was an 
element of force. See id. (requiring force as an element for individuals charged with sex trafficking of 
individuals over eighteen but not as an element for individuals under eighteen). 
 41 See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2018, at 
71, U.N. Sales No. E.19.IV.2 (2018) [hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING] (providing data 
regarding the split between underage and adult sex trafficking victims). In contrast, the sex trafficked 
female population in Central America is roughly half minor girls and half women. Id. 
 42 See id. (finding that roughly 70% of trafficking victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation). 
The United Nations also found that of North America’s total trafficking victims, roughly 85% were 
women or girls. Id. at 71. 
 43 See Theodore R. Sangalis, Note, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked 
Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 415 (2011) (provid-
ing multiple reasons for the vulnerability of immigrant populations). Traffickers frequently exploit 
immigrants’ lack of trust with law enforcement and inexperience with American culture to coerce 
them into the illicit sex trade. See id. (noting that traffickers threaten to report immigrant victims to 
the police and often steal their identification papers). 
 44 See GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING, supra note 41, at 74 (describing the flow of foreign 
victims to the United States). Although the majority of victims in the United States are U.S. residents, 
the United States is known to be one of the larger markets for foreign victims. See id. at 73–74 (noting 
that a significant number of victims from Mexico, Central America, and East Asia are brought to the 
United States). Of all the trafficking victims brought to North America, roughly 8% are from East 
Asia and sent to the United States. Id. 
 45 See Sangalis, supra note 43, at 415 (providing the circumstances of immigrant communities 
that make them more vulnerable to traffickers’ manipulation); Nicholas Kulish et al., Behind Illicit 
Massage Parlors Lie a Vast Crime Network and Modern Indentured Servitude, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/us/massage-parlors-human-trafficking.html [https://
perma.cc/Z6M8-ZVD5] (explaining how traffickers will lure potential victims from their immigrant 
communities and then force them into the sex trade with financial threats). 
 46 See Stephen C. Parker & Jonathan T. Skrmetti, Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on 
Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1018–19 (2013) (describing the “grooming” 
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creating an environment of fear and seclusion in order to make the victim feel 
as though she must comply with the trafficker’s orders.47 Traffickers engage in 
mental abuse by constantly declaring the victim’s unworthiness and emphasiz-
ing the victim’s powerlessness.48 Grooming can also entail episodes of escalat-
ing violence to establish control over the victims, although psychological 
abuse remains more common than physical abuse.49 Sex traffickers also use 
substances to incapacitate the victim, sometimes providing drugs and alcohol 
to exploit an individual’s pre-existing addiction.50 To maintain control over the 
victim, traffickers often repeat threats of physical violence and emphasize the 
victim’s increasing separation from society, family, and friends.51 Once the sex 
trafficker has established control over the victim, the trafficker then seeks an 
individual willing to pay for a commercial sex act.52 Traffickers will sell their 
victims through a multitude of avenues including massage parlors, escort ser-
vices, and street corners.53 
                                                                                                                           
process as the perpetrator’s identification and subsequent exploitation of the victim’s vulnerabilities to 
ensure compliance with the perpetrator’s commands). Aside from “grooming,” sex traffickers will 
also resort to kidnapping the victim or using alcohol or drugs to overcome the victim. See id. (explain-
ing that kidnapping and drugging are far less commonly employed by traffickers than “grooming”). 
 47 See KARA, supra note 35, at 187 (describing how traffickers ensure their victims follow their 
orders). Kara provides an example of a victim who witnessed the sex traffickers raping other victims 
in order to compel them to stay in the brothel. Id. 
 48 See Mellissa Withers, Psychological Tactics Used by Human Traffickers, PSYCH. TODAY (Oct. 
19, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/modern-day-slavery/201610/psychological-
tactics-used-human-traffickers [https://perma.cc/ERP2-WBWB] (concluding that traffickers’ use of 
mental abuse decreases their chances of law enforcement detection). Traffickers avoid inflicting bodi-
ly injuries so as to decrease the chances that medical and law enforcement personnel could notice a 
victim of sex trafficking. Id. Additionally, sex trafficking victims who have been brought to the Unit-
ed States without proper documentation are more vulnerable to mental manipulation because they 
already are in a situation without family, friends, or legal recourse. Id. 
 49 See KARA, supra note 35, at 187 (noting instances where the traffickers utilized physical force 
against their victims); Withers, supra note 48 (finding that traffickers engage in psychological abuse 
much more frequently than physical abuse). 
 50 See KARA, supra note 35, at 187 (providing specifics for how traffickers establish and maintain 
control over their victims); Emma Eastwood-Paticchio, Addicted to You: Drug Addiction as a Means 
of Coercion, HUM. TRAFFICKING INST. https://www.traffickingmatters.com/addicted-to-you-drug-
addiction-as-a-means-of-coercion/ [https://perma.cc/WC83-32M8] (describing how traffickers manip-
ulate victims’ drug addictions to further exert control). 
 51 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESOURCES: IDENTIFYING AND INTERACTING 
WITH VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING (July 2012) (providing a list of psychological tactics that 
traffickers use to maintain control over their victims). The purpose of psychological abuse is to ensure 
the victims’ constant fear of the traffickers, thus ensuring that they continue to follow the trafficker’s 
orders. Id. 
 52 See generally Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 46, at 1018–19 (providing an overview of the 
chronological timeline that sex traffickers take when establishing control over their victims). 
 53 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING 4 
(2017) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING] (listing massage par-
lors and nightclubs for additional outlets that traffickers will seek to utilize aside from online advertis-
ing); BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 13, at 5 
(listing places where sex trafficking predominantly occurred prior to the internet). 
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2. The Growth of Sex Trafficking 
In the United States, sex trafficking accounts for roughly eighty percent 
of all suspected human trafficking incidents reported to law enforcement.54 It is 
significant to note that the breadth of sex trafficking in the U.S. is difficult to 
ascertain because many victims do not report the crime to law enforcement.55 
Like other forms of illicit conduct, sex trafficking is difficult to track because 
of the extent to which it operates beyond the scope of law enforcement detec-
tion.56 
Despite a lack of precise data, research demonstrates that the marketplace 
for sex trafficked individuals has continued to expand since Congress first 
acknowledged sex trafficking as a specific crime in 2000.57 In 2000, Congress 
estimated that roughly 50,000 women and children were forced into the sex 
trade annually in the United States.58 Current estimates indicate that at least 
192,000 individuals remain enslaved by sex traffickers.59 In 2017 alone, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating 782 instances of 
suspected human trafficking.60 Of the 499 individuals that the Department of 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECT-
ED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008–2010, at 1 (Apr. 2011) (noting that federal law enforce-
ment categorized roughly 11% of the human trafficking incidents as forced labor and 7% as an unde-
termined form). 
 55 See NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 53, at 2 (ascribing 
the scarcity of comprehensive data to the lack of self-reporting from victims and the extent that perpe-
trators’ intimidation and threats towards victims impedes law enforcement). See generally SARAH 
GODOY, REBECCA SADWICK, & KATHLEEN BACA, U.C.L.A. LUSKIN SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, SHED-
DING LIGHT ON SEX TRAFFICKING: RESEARCH, DATA, AND TECHNOLOGIES WITH THE GREATEST 
IMPACT 5–6 (2016) (finding a lack of comprehensive data on sex trafficking in the United States and 
advocating for a centralized database accessible to both federal and local law enforcement). 
 56 See Lindsey N. Roberson, She Leads a Lonely Life, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 359, 362 (2017) 
(noting the difficulty in ascertaining data for criminal activity, including sex and drug trafficking); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2017, at 49 
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT] (noting that federal agencies 
do not record local or state law enforcement data regarding their efforts towards sex trafficking). 
 57 See TVPA § 103(b)(9) (defining the act of “sex trafficking”); BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING 
FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 13, at 5 (linking the growth of online adver-
tising to the rise in sex trafficked individuals); URBAN INST., supra note 17, at 234 (citing the growth 
of sex trafficking in recent years). 
 58 See TVPA § 102(b)(1) (finding that over 700,000 individuals are globally sex trafficked across 
international borders). 
 59 See INT’L LABOR OFFICE, GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: FORCED LABOR AND 
FORCED MARRIAGE 39 (2017) (finding that there are roughly 4.8 million individuals globally in the 
sex trade and that roughly 4% of those victims are in the United States). The ILO found that over 70% 
of individuals forced into the sex trade are in Asia and the Pacific region. Id. Despite the article’s title, 
the ILO differentiates between sex trafficking and forced marriage and, as such, the aforementioned 
sex trade numbers do not include individuals involved in forced marriages. Id. 
 60 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 56, at 18 (also 
noting the 833 human trafficking investigations undertaken by Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) in 2017). 
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Justice (DOJ) convicted under human trafficking statutes in 2017, 471 were 
classified as sex traffickers.61 
Rather than believing the internet is reducing the amount of street-level 
sex trafficking, researchers have argued that the internet has led to a greater 
demand for commercial sex.62 This is partially due to the ease with which cus-
tomers can now search for online advertisements and complete transactions.63 
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) reported a 
1,432% increase in child sex trafficking cases from 2009 to 2014, a trend they 
attributed to sex traffickers’ online advertisements.64 The NCMEC also found 
that 88% of its reported instances of child sex trafficking from 2012 to 2017 
involved the use of online classified advertisements.65 Of the reports made to 
the National Human Trafficking Hotline in 2017, there were five times as 
many sex trafficking instances that arose from online escort services as op-
posed to sales on the traditional street corner.66 
3. The Internet’s Role in Expanding Sex Trafficking 
Unlike the traditional street corner, the internet provides traffickers with a 
more profitable business model.67 Because most websites do not charge for 
third-party posts, the internet allows traffickers to cheaply acquire clients for 
their victims’ services.68 The internet makes the client base exponentially larg-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. (explaining that the DOJ pursued these convictions under both specific trafficking stat-
utes and non-trafficking criminal statutes). 
 62 See URBAN INST., supra note 17, at 234 (concluding that online advertisements for commercial 
sex acts have increased the size of the customer pool for commercial sex). The study rejects the notion 
that the internet has led to a decrease in sales of victims by traditional avenues such as massage par-
lors. See id. (tracing the growth of sex trafficking to the emergence of the internet in the 1980s). In-
stead, the advent of the internet has merely allowed for traffickers to increase their customer base. See 
id. (describing the internet’s ability to attract more customers than were customarily found at the street 
level market). 
 63 See The Latest Developments in Combating Online Sex Trafficking, supra note 28 (detailing 
how the internet leads to a larger customer base). 
 64 See Amicus Br. of Nat’l Center for Missing & Exploited Children at 2, J.S. v. Village Voice 
Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. Sept. 15, 2014) (No. 4492-02-II), 2014 WL 4913544 
(linking the rise in child sex trafficking to sex traffickers’ ability to use the internet to advertise). 
 65 See id. at 5 (noting that most of the child sex trafficking cases that the NCMEC deals with 
involve ads specifically posted on Backpage.com). 
 66 See POLARIS, STATISTICS FROM THE NATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING HOTLINE AND BEFREE 
TEXTLINE 2 (2018). It is important to note that the information garnered by the National Human Traf-
ficking Hotline is only based upon individuals who voluntarily call and self-report their instances of 
trafficking. Id. at 1. 
 67 See BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 13, 
at 5 (listing higher profits, efficient transportation of victims, and avoidance of law enforcement as 
three advantages to sex traffickers for advertising online as opposed to in-person). 
 68 See Melissa Farley et al., Online Prostitution and Trafficking, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1039, 1043 
(2013) (noting that the internet has made sex trafficking more profitable because of traffickers’ ability 
to reach more clients at a much faster rate); Aamer Madhani, Backpage.com Thumbs Nose at Sheriff 
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er than what is available at the street level.69 Solicitation most often occurs via 
the internet with personal advertisements.70 Traditionally used for the sales of 
goods or services from one individual to another, classified sites allow clients 
and traffickers to find one another anonymously.71 In this type of transaction, 
the individual meets the victim at a prearranged location and exchanges money 
with the sex trafficker.72 
Traffickers’ online advertisements often contain photographs of the victim 
and can contain widely-known terms to signify whether the victim is under-
age.73 For example, clients seeking underage victims can look for terms in the 
advertisement such as “Lolita” or “Amber Alert.”74 The advertisements often 
assume the guise of promoting escort services or personal massages.75 Many of 
the larger websites known for their classified ad sections, such as Craigslist 
and Backpage, hosted specific sections for adult services where traffickers 
would post their advertisements.76 
                                                                                                                           
After Visa, MasterCard Cut Ties, USA TODAY (July 9, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2015/07/09/backpage-free-adult-services-ads-mastercard-visa/29931651/ [https://perma.cc/
4RDJ-3THJ] (describing how Backpage allows third-parties to upload advertisements for free). The 
internet enables traffickers to reach clients who otherwise might not find themselves looking to buy 
sex on an ordinary street corner. See Farley et al., supra, at 1046 (explaining how sex traffickers can 
lure clients first with free pornography and then ultimately solicit them with offers of sex). Aside from 
the internet, traffickers sell their victims, in the form of forced prostitution, in various entertainment 
venues or on the street. See id. at 1044 (listing motels and massage parlors as two common physical 
locations where sex trafficking occurs without the use of the internet). 
 69 See URBAN INST., supra note 17, at 192 (noting that sex traffickers profit more from online 
classified advertisements than other methods, such as word-of-mouth or social networking accounts, 
because it connects them to both a larger and wealthier base of customers). 
 70 See NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 53, at 4 (noting that 
the online advertisements do not proclaim sex acts but rather take the guise of escort services and 
often falsify the victim’s name and age). 
 71 See 164 CONG. REC. H1290-02 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2018) (statement of Rep. Roby) (describing 
how sex traffickers have taken advantage of the personal classified sections on websites to post adver-
tisements of their victims). 
 72 See, e.g., Doe, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (providing the facts of Jane Doe No. 3, a sex trafficking 
victim, who was taken to a hotel and sexually assaulted by the individual who found her through Back-
page advertisements); Charlotte Alter, Catching Johns: Inside the National Push to Arrest Men Who Buy 
Sex, TIME http://time.com/sex-buyers-why-cops-across-the-u-s-target-men-who-buy-prostitutes/ [https://
perma.cc/UD3Y-AHSQ] (explaining a police operation where undercover agents posted ads on Back-
page and arranged for male buyers to meet them at a nearby hotel). 
 73 See Marguerite A. O’Brien, Free Speech or Slavery Profiteering: Solutions for Policing Online 
Sex-Trafficking Advertisement, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 289, 295 (2017) (describing how traf-
fickers manipulate the advertisements to suggest to clients that the individual for sale is underage). 
 74 See Timothy Williams, Backpage’s Sex Ads Are Gone. Child Trafficking? Hardly, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/us/backpage-ads-sex-trafficking.html [https://
perma.cc/U332-2P3C] (noting additional phrases such as “100% young” and “oh daddy can i be your 
candy”). 
 75 See Kulish et al., supra note 45 (describing the seemingly consensual services that traffickers 
use to disguise the real purpose of their advertisements). 
 76 See Jody Raphael, Denial of Harm: Sex Trafficking, Backpage, and Free Speech Absolutism, 
2:1 (Art. 8) J. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & VIOLENCE 1 (2017) (providing Craigslist’s “Casual En-
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B. Legislative Responses to Sex Trafficking 
1. The TVPA and Subsequent Reauthorizations  
Congress has expanded the scope of liability for those involved in sex 
trafficking throughout the last century.77 Originally, prosecutors charged sex 
traffickers under a law that criminalized transporting prostitutes across state 
lines.78 But by the end of the twentieth century, Congress recognized that sex 
trafficking was so ubiquitous that it warranted its own criminal law.79 Specifi-
cally, Congress acknowledged that law enforcement and federal prosecutors 
lacked the adequate tools to combat sex trafficking.80 
In 2000, the United States government initiated its largest effort to combat 
sex trafficking by passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act (TVPA).81 The TVPA was the first federal law that independently recog-
nized sex trafficking as a crime.82 The purpose of the TVPA was to specifically 
                                                                                                                           
counters” section and Backpage’s adult escort section as examples). Backpage’s adult escort services 
section was its most popular attraction, garnering 99% of its profits for charging advertisers from 
2013 to 2015. Id. Facing a Senate investigation and subsequent publication of its findings, Backpage 
closed its adult services section in 2017. Id. at 2.  
 77 See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. 
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3012–17 (2006) (providing a history 
of congressional action towards sex trafficking from 1875 to the passage of TVPA in 2000). 
 78 See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 
1250–51 (2011) (finding that prior to 2000, federal prosecutors pursued sex trafficking charges under 
the Mann Act of 1910). The purpose of the Act was to criminalize the transportation of non-
consenting women and girls across state lines for prostitution. Id. Charges brought under the Mann 
Act stemmed from a range of activity, extending well beyond the Act’s original intent to combat inter-
state prostitution. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1917) (allowing for a prose-
cution under the Mann Act for “immoral purposes” other than commercial sexual acts). In Caminetti, 
two individuals were charged under the Mann Act for crossing state lines in order to pursue a sexual 
relationship with one another. See id. at 482–83 (explaining how a man in Nevada arranged for a 
woman to travel from California to Nevada in order to have sex with him). In rejecting defendants’ 
appeal that the prosecution misused the Mann Act because this was not a case of interstate prostitu-
tion, the court held that “immoral purposes” could be interpreted broadly. See id. at 487 (finding that 
Congress intended the Mann Act to preclude forms of sexual impropriety beyond prostitution). 
 79 See TVPA § 102(b)(2) (noting that many individuals ensnared in human trafficking are victim-
ized for purposes of the “international sex trade”); David Stout, Passage in Senate Sends Bill on 
Forced Labor to President, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/12/us/
passage-in-senate-sends-bill-on-forced-labor-to-president.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.
cc/9JCK-2X6A] (describing the lack of specific sex trafficking laws prior to the passage of the law). 
 80 See TVPA § 102(b)(14) (concluding that current laws fail to appropriately punish the most 
offensive conduct of sex traffickers because they were intended to address less severe crimes). 
 81 See id. § 102(a) (describing the law’s objective to be tackling the widespread problem of sex 
trafficking); Mattar, supra note 78, at 1250 (describing the TVPA as the United States’ first acknowl-
edgement of sex trafficking as its own crime); LEVY, supra note 30, at 7 (finding the TVPA to be the 
first law in the United States that dealt collectively with all types of sex trafficking violations). 
 82 See TVPA § 102(b)(8) (providing the relevant statutory language); 146 CONG. REC. S10164-02 
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (characterizing the TVPA as the first of its 
kind to recognize sex trafficking as a specific federal crime). 
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target the crime of sex trafficking, to provide protection to victims, and to pro-
vide harsher penalties to perpetrators.83 Prosecutors previously looked to mul-
tiple criminal statutes to charge perpetrators, but now a single law codifies the 
conduct as criminal.84 Moreover, the TVPA sought to protect victims by setting 
aside federal funds for their security.85 Finally, with regards to punishment, the 
TVPA provides a minimum of twenty years and a maximum life sentence to 
those convicted.86 This serves as a much harsher penalty than the previous 
minimum punishment of ten years if the perpetrator was found guilty under an 
involuntary servitude statute.87 
Acknowledging that criminal liability was not sufficient to hold perpetra-
tors accountable, Congress added a civil cause of action to the TVPA in 2003 
that allowed victims to bring suit against their perpetrators.88 The TVPA’s civil 
remedy provision shifted agency from the prosecutor to the victim, demon-
strating a legislative focus on empowering the victim.89 Victims could bring 
civil suits regardless of whether there was a criminal action arising out of the 
same facts, although any civil suit is stayed pending the resolution of a crimi-
nal case.90 The law provided victims with broader discretion to determine the 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See TVPA § 102 (stating that the purposes of the TVPA are “to combat trafficking in persons, a 
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to en-
sure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims”). 
 84 See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in the United States and the Law Enacted to Stop It Here 
and Abroad, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 317, 329 (2005) (contributing the low rate of arrests 
and convictions of sex traffickers prior to the TVPA because prosecutors previously had to apply 
multiple trafficking laws). 
 85 See id. at 330 (noting the TVPA’s allocation of federal funds for victims’ services, including 
protective measures and resources to assist them through the aftermath of their trafficking). 
 86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (providing the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment); 146 
CONG. REC. S10164-02 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (explaining how the 
punishment for traffickers prior to the TVPA enactment was inadequate). 
 87 See 146 CONG. REC. S10164-02 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (ac-
knowledging the disparity in a human trafficker’s sentence of ten years under an involuntary servitude 
statute and a drug trafficker’s potential sentence of life imprisonment). 
 88 See Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action 
for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1661 (2007) (finding that the 2003 
amendment addressed certain deficiencies within the original TVPA). For example, the years immedi-
ately following the passage of the TVPA in 2000 saw a very low number of criminal convictions for 
human traffickers, despite the expected growth in prosecutions due to the law. Id. at 1666. 
 89 See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (allowing for a victim of the sex trafficking crimes provided by §§ 1589–
1591 to claim a civil cause of action against the perpetrator); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, 
Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 
16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 17 (2004) (naming the advantages that a civil remedy provides a hu-
man trafficking victim, including agency over their case); Nam, supra note 88, at 1666 (framing the 
TVPA’s civil remedy provision as a significant development for victims). 
 90 See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4, 117 
Stat. 2875 (staying any civil cause of action for the duration of a criminal case that includes investiga-
tion, prosecution, and final adjudication of the claim); H.R. REP. NO. 108-264(II), at 17 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the civil stay requirement responds to the Department of Justice’s concerns that civil 
discovery would obstruct their criminal investigations); Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1254–55 
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outcome of their cases in three significant ways.91 First, civil damages can be 
significantly larger amounts than the amount of restitution ordered in a crimi-
nal case.92 Second, the civil remedy route allows for the victim to name more 
parties as co-defendants because of the lower evidentiary standard required by 
civil cases.93 Third, because the victim is the plaintiff in a civil suit, rather than 
the government, the victim must approve any settlement plan.94 
In 2008, Congress again reauthorized the TVPA and expanded the crimi-
nal and civil liability for individuals beyond that of the mere perpetrator.95 The 
reauthorization extended liability to anyone who financially benefitted from 
the act of sex trafficking and was aware of such benefit.96 The reauthorization 
also added a conspiracy charge, which extends culpability to those uninvolved 
in the physical act itself and to circumstances where the conduct does not cul-
minate in a sex act.97 Federal prosecutors celebrated the 2008 reauthorization 
because it enabled them to charge a broader variety of actors involved in sex 
trafficking.98 
2. FOSTA and Internet Liability  
Congress first confronted the issue of sex trafficking advertisements when 
it passed the Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 2015 (SAVE 
                                                                                                                           
(11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the stay provision should not be used to aid criminal defendants in 
avoiding civil cases wrought from the same facts). 
 91 See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 89, at 16 (noting how victims’ civil cases differ from 
criminal prosecutions). 
 92 See id. (finding that civil damages can more accurately reflect the emotional and/or physical 
harm done to the victim than restitution amounts). The authors also point to the potential detrimental 
effect of civil damages on other human traffickers. See id. (finding that the threat of civil damages 
could discourage traffickers from entering the trade). 
 93 See id. at 17 (citing the preponderance-of-evidence burden as allowing plaintiffs to name larger 
entities as co-conspirators in human trafficking cases more easily than prosecutors could in a criminal 
case). 
 94 See id. (naming the key difference between criminal and civil suits as the extent of decision-
making capabilities that a victim holds as the plaintiff). 
 95 See TVPA Reauthorization Act § 222 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) 
(expanding criminal liability, in relevant part, to “[w]hoever knowingly benefits, financially or by 
receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in any act in violation 
of [the relevant sex trafficking laws] . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned”).  
 96 See id. (expanding criminal liability to include those who are engaged in various aspects of sex 
trafficking). 
97 See id. (stating, in relevant part, “[w]hoever conspires with another to violate section 1591 shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both”). 
 98 See Mark J. Kappelhoff, Federal Prosecutions of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking a Blow 
Against Modern Day Slavery, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 9, 19–20 (2008) (crediting the 2008 reauthoriza-
tion for successful sex trafficking prosecutions). The 2008 reauthorization allowed prosecutors to 
charge multiple individuals beyond the individual sex trafficker. See, e.g., United States v. Carreto, 
583 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (charging three defendants with conspiracy to commit sex traffick-
ing). 
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Act).99 The SAVE Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the law criminalizing sex 
trafficking, to include the “advertising” of sex trafficking as a TVPA viola-
tion.100 The legislative intent of the SAVE Act was to hold advertisers account-
able and, in doing so, expanded the realm of individuals who could be held 
responsible for their involvement in sex trafficking.101 To be charged under the 
SAVE Act requires that the individual knows the advertisement pertained to a 
sex trafficking enterprise.102 Congress expanded the reach of the SAVE Act 
when it passed FOSTA in 2018, explicitly extending liability to internet service 
providers (ISPs) that promote sex trafficking by advertising for it on their plat-
forms.103 
FOSTA creates a new statute regarding criminal and civil action towards 
ISPs that advertise sex trafficking.104 First, it changes the liability for ISPs un-
der the TVPA from those that “knowingly benefitted” from advertisements 
with sex trafficked victims to ISPs that have “the intent to promote or facili-
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation (SAVE) Act of 2015, Pub. No. 114-22, § 2 
(2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)) (adding the advertisement of sex trafficking to 
the list of offenses included in § 1591). The SAVE Act requires a party to be “knowingly advertising” 
sex trafficking. See id. For a general discussion regarding the SAVE Act and its shortcomings, see 
Ashley A. Cardenas, Note, The SAVE Act of 2015: Congress’ Attempt to Reprioritize Online Child 
Sex Trafficking, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 505 (2017). 
 100 See SAVE Act § 2 (amending § 1591 to extend to advertising). 
 101 See Sandra Elizabeth Kowalski, Holding Internet Advertising Providers Accountable for Sex 
Trafficking: Impediments to Criminal Prosecution and a Proposed Response, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
99, 108 (2018) (describing how Congress intended to hold advertisers of sex trafficking responsible 
with the passage of the SAVE Act if the advertiser knew the material contained sex trafficked individ-
uals). The SAVE Act differs from FOSTA because it does not explicitly address online advertise-
ments and internet service providers, instead adding “advertising” to the criminal actions associated 
with sex trafficking in section 1591. Id. at 107–08. 
 102 See Backpage.com, LLC v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 96, 109 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that the 
SAVE Act requires the standard of knowledge for any advertising violations). In Lynch, Backpage 
claimed that the SAVE Act extended to websites who advertised for sex trafficking, regardless of 
whether they knew that the content featured sex trafficked victims. See id. at 103 (noting Backpage’s 
claim that they would be held criminally liable under the SAVE Act for any third-party advertise-
ments that they hosted that featured victims). The D.C. Circuit Court rejected this reading and inter-
preted the statute to require knowledge on the part of websites. See id. at 109 (finding that Backpage 
could only be held criminally liable if it intended to profit from the advertisements with sex trafficked 
victims). 
 103 Compare SAVE Act § 2 (amending § 1591 to extend to advertising), with FOSTA § 3 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A) (penalizing, in relevant part, “[w]hoever . . . owns, manages, 
or operates an interactive computer service . . . with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution 
of another person”).  
 104 See FOSTA § 3 (creating the new statute for ISP liability in both criminal and civil claims); 
Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing the 
statutory framework of FOSTA). The Woodhull court described § 2421A as the cornerstone of the 
entire legislation. See 334 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (emphasizing the addition of § 2421A to the liability 
sphere for sex trafficking crimes); Citron & Jurecic, supra note 20 (explaining how FOSTA alters 
previous ISP immunity and as a consequence leaves ISPs with greater liability). 
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tate” sex trafficking.105 Prior to FOSTA, prosecutors struggled to meet the 
standard of “knowingly benefitting” from advertisements as they pursued 
criminal charges under the TVPA.106 Second, the liability applies to any indi-
vidual who “owns, manages, or operates” an ISP.107 The lower mens rea, cou-
pled with the inclusive definition of ISP, allows for both victims and prosecu-
tors to pursue claims more easily and against more actors.108 
With regards to criminal prosecutions, FOSTA allows state and local 
prosecutors to sue ISPs, expanding its use beyond federal prosecutors.109 It 
accomplishes this by amending a law that ISPs previously used as a liability 
shield for any state or local criminal action brought against them.110 Addition-
ally, state attorneys general can now bring civil actions against ISPs on behalf 
of their affected residents.111 
 After FOSTA’s passage, sex trafficking victims’ advocates and lawmak-
ers celebrated its anticipated contribution to federal efforts to combat sex traf-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See FOSTA § 3 (amending liability); Citron & Jurecic, supra note 20 (explaining that for the 
first time in two decades ISPs can now be held liable for third-party content). 
 106 See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Robert 
Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 27, 2018) (noting the high mens rea standard for 
ISPs under § 1591 that prosecutors have grappled with meeting); Dias, supra note 32 (describing the 
measure as providing government lawyers with an easier way to respond to ISPs engaged in the facili-
tation of sex trafficking). 
 107 See FOSTA § 3 (providing relevant language). 
 108 See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd to Rep. Robert Goodlatte, supra note 106 (noting a lower 
mens rea would ease bringing criminal charges against alleged perpetrators). The House’s version of 
the bill sought a lower mens rea standard of “recklessness,” holding ISPs liable when they knew or 
should have known that their conduct could result in harm, but this ultimately lost out to the Senate’s 
standard of knowledge in the version that passed into law. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. § 4 (as intro-
duced in House, Apr. 3, 2017) (including the mens rea standard for the House bill); Mary Graw Leary, 
Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 553, 610 (2018) (noting that members of the tech industry lobbied against the House version 
because of its lower mens rea standard for civil liability). 
 109 See FOSTA § 4 (amending Section 230 to preclude its application to any violations of federal 
or state law). Prior to FOSTA’s passage, websites could use Section 230 as a defense in state law 
violations. See Mark Sullivan, The 1996 Law That Made the Web Is in the Crosshairs, FAST COMPA-
NY (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/maybe-its-time-to-take-away-the-
outdated-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits [https://perma.cc/7GCY-43CB] (noting that neither state 
attorney generals nor individual victims could bring claims against websites prior to the passage of 
FOSTA because of the broad immunity created by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA)). By amending the CDA, FOSTA allows for state prosecutors to charge ISPs without fear of 
the Section 230 liability shield. See id. (explaining that state attorneys general can now bring civil 
claims against websites due to FOSTA). 
 110 See Sullivan, supra note 109 (noting that prior to the passage of FOSTA, ISPs could only be 
charged by federal prosecutors and not state or local prosecutors). Prior to the passage of FOSTA, 
Section 230 immunity was only barred from usage in federal criminal law, intellectual property law, 
and communications privacy law. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2018) (including immunity from state and 
local criminal law prior to FOSTA’s passage). 
 111 See FOSTA § 6 (creating a new action to be taken by state attorneys general). An attorney 
general can sue under the legal theory of parens patriae, which views state actors as responsible for 
protecting their respective citizens. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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ficking.112 While some of FOSTA’s supporters focused on the benefit of in-
creased criminal prosecutions, others emphasized ISPs’ inability to claim im-
munity.113 Critics and ISPs similarly focused on these aspects.114 In 2018, in 
Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States, the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation argued that the Act violates the protections guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.115 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that they failed to prove an injury-in-
fact.116 Rather than challenging the law in court, other ISPs responded to FOS-
TA by closing down their personal advertisement sections, citing fear of litiga-
tion without their former liability shield.117 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Dias, supra note 32 (noting FOSTA received close to unanimous backing in both cham-
bers of Congress); Cecilia Kang & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sex Trafficking Bill Heads to Trump, Over 
Silicon Valley Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/business/
sex-trafficking-bill-senate.html [https://perma.cc/23SJ-JP9R] (showing the positive reaction from the 
World Without Exploitation, a victim-focused non-profit). 
 113 See Kang & Stolberg, supra note 112 (noting the influx of cases dismissed due to Section 230 
immunity in which courts acknowledged the severity of the victims’ alleged facts). 
 114 See Tom Jackman, Bill Enabling Prosecutors, Victims to Pursue Websites That Host Sex Traf-
fickers Heads to White House, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/true-crime/wp/2018/03/21/bill-enabling-prosecutors-to-pursue-websites-that-host-sex-traffickers-
heads-to-white-house/ [https://perma.cc/S5AT-5VAW] (explaining the concerns of the tech industry, 
namely that it makes them vulnerable to civil lawsuits). In addition to tech companies and free speech 
advocates, sex workers have voiced significant concerns toward the Act, claiming that it will lead to 
greater danger, as they are forced to sell their services on the street. See Emily Witt, After the Closure 
of Backpage, Increasingly Vulnerable Sex Workers Are Demanding Their Rights, NEW YORKER (June 
8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/after-the-closure-of-backpage-increasingly-
vulnerable-sex-workers-are-demanding-their-rights [https://perma.cc/VS4C-W6TJ] (noting how sex 
workers’ inability to advertise online is leading them to sell their services on the street and leaves 
them vulnerable to clients that they otherwise would try to avoid). 
 115 See 334 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (noting that the plaintiffs also challenge FOSTA for vagueness in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment). With regards to the First Amendment claim, plaintiffs argue that 
FOSTA places them in fear of civil suits and criminal prosecution, thus creating “an injury by chilling 
their speech.” See id. at 198 (noting plaintiffs’ argument that the fear of civil damages will force them 
to censor their own speech and their users’ speech). The other plaintiffs in the case included a sex 
workers’ advocacy organization, Human Rights Watch, the Internet Archive, and a massage therapist 
who posted advertisements on Craigslist. See id. at 198–203 (describing the nature of plaintiffs’ 
claims). 
 116 See id. at 198 (noting that each respective plaintiff lacks standing in the instant case). To allow 
a constitutional challenge against a statute, a court must find that the statute creates a real potential of 
harm for the plaintiff, specifically with regards to restricting their freedom of speech. See id. at 197 
(explaining the standing requirement for First Amendment statutory challenges). 
 117 See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 20 (noting Craigslist’s closure of its classified section and its 
provided reason that it could not afford to avail itself to such litigation); supra notes 109–110 and 
accompanying text (explaining how FOSTA amended Section 230 such that ISPs can no longer use it 
to claim immunity in lawsuits that allege ISPs facilitated sex trafficking). 
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C. First Amendment Framework 
The First Amendment protects individuals’ speech from government in-
terference.118 One of its core principles is that the government cannot infringe 
upon an individual’s speech based upon the content of the speech.119 The First 
Amendment relies upon the premise that society benefits from an unobstructed 
exchange of ideas among individuals.120 Its protection extends to speech that is 
offensive, regardless of how distasteful or disgusting society might find it.121 
Generally speaking, any government restriction on the content of an indi-
vidual’s free speech must serve a compelling government interest.122 Moreo-
ver, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.123 Nonethe-
less, there are several categories of content that are exempt from this two-part 
test.124 Speech that is obscene, fraudulent, defamatory, inciting, or in further-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (affirming that the First Amendment is 
based upon a devotion to the unobstructed spread of thoughts). 
 119 See id. (finding that the government cannot curtail First Amendment freedoms based upon the 
substance that the speech conveys). Nonetheless, the protection granted by the First Amendment has 
its limits. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) 
(affirming the Supreme Court’s lengthy jurisprudence that denies First Amendment protection to 
certain categories of speech). 
 120 See Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 758–59 (describing the First Amendment’s primary 
purpose to be the protection of speech relating to public issues); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957) (noting that the free trade of ideas allows for society to progress). 
 121 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (holding a Texas statute that criminalizes the 
burning of the Texas state flag as unconstitutional). The Court noted that a state’s basis for restricting 
free speech cannot be founded upon the degree to which various individuals find it repulsive or upset-
ting. See id. at 414 (noting that a key purpose of the First Amendment is to allow individuals to ex-
press unpopular opinions). 
 122 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that content-based restrictions 
on free speech must serve a “compelling government interest”). In R.A.V., the Supreme Court struck 
down a Minnesota statute that criminalized speech that incited violence based upon its racial, reli-
gious, or gendered content. Id. at 378. The Court rejected the state’s defense that the law was neces-
sary because it furthered the state’s interest in promoting historically marginalized individuals’ ability 
to carry on without fear of violence. Id. at 395. For laws that restrict the content of speech, such as 
Minnesota’s statute at issue in R.A.V., the Court requires that the law serves a “compelling govern-
ment interest.” Id. 
 123 See id. at 395 (rejecting Minnesota’s argument that content-based restrictions of speech were 
the only means to achieve their stated purpose). The Court reasoned that the statute impermissibly 
punished views that the local government deemed offensive, an overly broad infringement upon the 
First Amendment. See id. at 396 (concluding that the local government can provide a safe environ-
ment for its citizens without criminalizing any speech that the city council dislikes). 
 124 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (holding that some types of speech 
content do not receive First Amendment protection). In Stevens, the plaintiff claimed that a Texas 
statute prohibiting the dissemination of animal cruelty portrayals violated his First Amendment rights. 
See id. at 466 (describing plaintiff’s violation of the statute for selling videos of dogs fighting and 
attacking each another). The Court listed content that is obscene, defamatory, fraudulent, inciting, and 
speech in furtherance of a crime as lacking First Amendment protection. See id. at 468 (providing the 
types of speech that the Texas statute could constitutionally restrict). The Court rejected the Texas 
government’s claim that depictions of animal cruelty were in furtherance of a crime. See id. (finding 
that the statute applied to more types of speech than just that used to commit crimes, including depict-
2019] FOSTA and the First Amendment 2493 
ance of a crime does not comport with the First Amendment’s goal of promot-
ing the exchange of ideas and thus does not receive its protections.125 When 
content is challenged for constitutionality, the Supreme Court looks to whether 
the content falls into said category and, if so, the government is freed from 
showing that it serves a compelling interest.126 
The First Amendment does not extend to speech used to further a 
crime.127 In 1949, in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., the Supreme Court 
found that a union’s distribution of signs contributed to conduct that violated a 
state law and thus the signs were unprotected by the First Amendment.128 
There, a trade union picketed on the premises of an ice distribution company 
with the goal of pressuring the company to violate a state antitrade-restraint 
law.129 The Court held that the distribution of signs, coupled with the union’s 
other actions, qualified as criminal action.130 By rejecting the theory that the First 
Amendment provides blanket protection to all forms of speech, the Court em-
phasized that the right to free speech has certain exceptions.131 
                                                                                                                           
ing dead animals that died due to natural causes). The Court held that legislatures cannot add catego-
ries of unprotected speech because the list of categories is finite and should remain that way. Id. at 
469. 
 125 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941) (explaining that certain types of 
speech do not deserve constitutional protection because they do not align with the purpose of the First 
Amendment). In Chaplinsky, an individual was charged with violating a New Hampshire statute that 
prohibited verbally attacking anyone in public with derogatory or abusive language. See id. at 569 
(describing the individual’s conduct of yelling “fascist” at another individual on a public sidewalk in 
Rochester). Although the defendant claimed that the statute violated his First Amendment rights, the 
Court found that the First Amendment pertains to words that facilitate the unobstructed exchange of 
ideas and that his abusive words that furthered the crime served no such purpose. See id. at 572 (hold-
ing that words that could lead to violence are unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 126 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011) (holding that restraints on 
types of speech that fall within the Court’s categories of unprotected speech do not have to meet the 
strict scrutiny test). In Brown, petitioners challenged a California law that tried to regulate minors’ 
consumption of violent video games. See id. at 789 (describing the statute’s provision that set the 
minimum legal age of purchase at 18 years old). The Court held that speech embedded in violent 
video games did not fit into any category previously defined as unprotected by the First Amendment. 
See id. at 804 (listing the categories of speech that do not receive protection). As a result, the Court 
applied the strict scrutiny test and found that the statute failed to demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est. See id. (explaining how the Court first looks to whether the contested speech fits into a specified 
category and, if not, then applies the strict scrutiny test). 
 127 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (holding that transcribed 
or oral words that contribute to criminal conduct are not protected by the First Amendment). 
 128 See id. at 498 (holding for the first time that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of 
speech does not extend to speech that constitutes a course of criminal action). 
 129 See id. (finding the trade union took specific actions with the ultimate goal of pressuring the 
ice distribution company to stop doing business with non-organized ice salespeople). 
 130 See id. (rejecting the union’s contention that the distribution of signs should be viewed inde-
pendent of the union’s other actions). 
 131 See id. (acknowledging that the breadth of First Amendment protections does not apply to 
every situation). 
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Since the Giboney ruling, the Supreme Court has expanded its doctrine of 
speech used in furtherance of a crime to include speech that solicits a crime.132 
In 2008, in United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of a statute that criminalized making requests for child pornogra-
phy.133 Rejecting the First Amendment challenge, the Court used reasoning 
similar to Giboney, again finding that speech used to request or engage in illic-
it conduct is incompatible with the First Amendment.134 The criminality of the 
speech associated with solicitation did not rely on the actual transfer of child 
pornography, but merely upon the request to provide or offer pornographic 
images.135 Under the Court’s reading of the statute, this included any individual 
who advertised for the distribution of child pornography.136 
II. ADDRESSING FOSTA’S CRITICS AND PROPONENTS 
Since FOSTA’s passage in 2018, there has been significant debate regard-
ing its constitutionality and its effect on users’ free speech.137 ISPs are con-
cerned about the expanded criminal and civil liability that now allows federal, 
state, and local prosecutors alike to bring suit against them.138 They argue that 
this new liability amounts to a violation of their First Amendment right to free 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (holding that solicitations to give or 
receive child pornography are unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 133 See id. (rejecting appellant’s First Amendment claims that the statute violated his First Amend-
ment rights). The appellant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) when he uploaded 
child pornography images to an online chat room. See id. at 291 (describing how appellant unknowingly 
sent child porn to an undercover law enforcement agent); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (penaliz-
ing anyone who, in relevant part, “knowingly . . . advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solic-
its” child pornography). In determining a First Amendment claim, the Court looks to whether the 
statute’s language criminalizes too much constitutionally protected speech. See United States v. Ste-
vens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010) (holding an animal cruelty statute to be overbroad because it criminal-
ized portrayals of animals that were not taken with malicious intent). 
 134 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (determining the lack of significance that such speech contrib-
utes to the free exchange of ideas); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (holding that a newspaper could not publish a third party’s advertisement 
seeking only male applicants that violated a federal sex discrimination statute). 
 135 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (interpreting the statute to criminalize the offer to give or re-
quest to provide child pornography). 
 136 See id. (sweeping in any advertisers of child pornography per the terms of the statute). 
 137 See, e.g., Anna Schechter & Dennis Romero, FOSTA Sex Trafficking Law Becomes Center of 
Debate About Tech Responsibility, NBC NEWS (July 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-
news/sex-trafficking-bill-becomes-center-debate-about-tech-responsibility-n892876 [https://perma.
cc/VNQ2-ZBM9] (providing the ongoing social commentary regarding FOSTA). Days after its pas-
sage, FOSTA was lauded by sex trafficking advocacy groups and denigrated by tech companies. See 
id. (describing the wide variation in responses to FOSTA). 
 138 See, e.g., Aaron Mackey & Elliot Harmon, Congress Censors the Internet, but EFF Continues 
to Fight FOSTA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/
12/congress-censors-internet-eff-continues-fight-fosta-2018-review [https://perma.cc/S9D4-K366] 
(describing FOSTA as the most significant encroachment to internet free speech in the past twenty 
years). 
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speech.139 Free speech advocates and tech companies attack FOSTA on the 
grounds that it will reduce free speech on the internet by forcing ISPs to limit 
third parties’ ability to post content on websites.140 Sex industry workers com-
plain that FOSTA has revoked their access to advertise their consensual ser-
vices.141 Nonetheless, many other constituencies argue that FOSTA brings sex 
trafficking efforts into the twenty-first century by acknowledging the role of 
internet advertising in the sex trafficking trade.142 This Section addresses both 
the critics and proponents of FOSTA.143 
A. Critics of FOSTA 
1. Internet Service Provider Concerns Regarding the First Amendment 
ISPs claim that FOSTA infringes upon their First Amendment right to free 
speech because FOSTA amends Section 230(c) of the Communications Decen-
cy Act (CDA), a law widely understood to provide immunity to ISPs for any 
content posted by third-party users.144 Congress passed the CDA to encourage 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See Br. for Inst. for Free Speech as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6, Woodhull Free-
dom Found. v. United States, No. 18-5298 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2019) (describing how FOSTA will 
infringe upon the internet’s ability to provide platforms for individuals to exchange ideas with one 
another). 
 140 See id. at 4 (noting how FOSTA had already restricted the free speech of appellants). Specifi-
cally, appellant Woodhull Freedom Foundation claims that it cancelled an upcoming event for fear 
that advertising for it online would be prosecuted as the facilitation of sex trafficking under FOSTA. 
Id. 
 141 See Amy Zimmerman, Sex Workers Fear for Their Future: How SESTA Is Putting Many 
Prostitutes in Peril, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/sex-workers-fear-
for-their-future-how-sesta-is-putting-many-prostitutes-in-peril [https://perma.cc/DAD7-6CYG] (list-
ing the variety of websites that closed in the wake of FOSTA for fear of increased liability). 
 142 See Linda Smith, SHARED HOPE STATEMENT REGARDING FOSTA-SESTA AND THE BACK-
PAGE SEIZURE, SHARED HOPE INT’L (Apr. 11, 2018), https://sharedhope.org/2018/04/statement-
regarding-fosta-sesta/ [https://perma.cc/9P64-S34J] (advocating for the need of FOSTA). In their 
support of FOSTA, trafficking victim advocates point to the harm caused by online advertisements 
and the way in which they expand the sex trafficking market. See id. (explaining how online adver-
tisements further victimize individuals by allowing the trafficker complete control over when and how 
they are seen). 
 143 See infra notes 144–203 and accompanying text. 
 144 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018) (defining “internet service provider” in relevant part as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server”); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (holding that Section 230 prevents websites from being held liable for any claims arising 
out of third-party content posted on their websites); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (describing Section 230’s purpose as dismissing claims against ISPs that arise out of the 
ISPs’ function as a distributor of third-party content); Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 
F. Supp. 3d 185, 189 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that the plaintiffs challenge FOSTA on the grounds that it 
violates their First Amendment rights). The plaintiff is an organization that runs websites, which fea-
ture speech regarding consensual sex work. Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 192. Specifically, the plain-
tiff was concerned that FOSTA would preclude it from online advertising for its annual event on con-
sensual sex workers. Id. 
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the internet’s growth.145 Congress intended Section 230 to create a safe harbor 
for ISPs that, in good faith, tried to prohibit obscene material.146 As evidence 
of this objective, Section 230 is titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ block-
ing and screening of offensive material.”147 At the same time, lawmakers want-
ed to balance regulation of content with encouraging the internet’s growth.148 
Therefore, legislators made the conscious decision to treat ISPs differently 
than publishers of traditional media outlets.149 Section 230 allows for ISPs to 
escape liability for publishing potentially damaging content, whereas newspa-
pers, television, and radio can be held liable for defamation merely by publish-
ing the material (and not actually authoring it).150 Prior to FOSTA’s passage, 
ISPs were only precluded from invoking Section 230 as an immunity shield in 
cases regarding federal criminal law, intellectual property law, and communi-
cations privacy law.151 
In the early internet era, courts split on the question of ISPs’ liability for 
the information posted on their sites.152 Section 230 responded to a growing 
concern that ISPs’ decision to edit material on their platforms would transform 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See S. REP. NO. 104-23, 1 (1995) (explaining that the purpose of the CDA is to create a “pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework” in the emerging internet era). With the CDA, 
legislators also strove to protect minors from obscene content. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 
1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the CDA’s main objective with regards to regulating children’s access to 
certain kinds of content). Although many of those provisions of the CDA were struck down as uncon-
stitutional violations of free speech, Section 230(c) survived constitutional challenges. Id.; see, e.g., 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997) (striking the CDA’s prohibition on “indecent” material by 
finding that the word is undefined and vague, leading to the violation of individuals’ First Amendment 
rights). 
 146 See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 403 (2017) (explaining that lawmakers rec-
ognized the need for companies within the industry to moderate content because a federal agency 
would be unable to monitor such a high quantity of it). 
 147 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 148 See id. § 230(a)(3) (describing ISPs as providing “a forum for a true diversity of political dis-
course”); Leary, supra note 108, at 561 (articulating the purpose of the CDA as trying to incentivize 
ISPs to censor obscene content while simultaneously avoiding overregulation that would stifle their 
growth). 
 149 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026–27 (providing the legislative history of Section 230). 
 150 See id. (explaining the different treatment that Congress chose to afford ISPs than traditional 
publishers of content). 
 151 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (limiting the use of Section 230 in these circumstances). 
 152 See Marie-Helen Maras, Online Classified Advertisement Sites: Pimps and Facilitators of 
Prostitution and Sex Trafficking?, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2017, at 17 (noting that the 1990s witnessed a 
growing question in the courts of how to assess liability when an individual sought tort damages from 
a website). Compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (find-
ing that an online news distributor could not be held liable for posting third-party content), with Strat-
ton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (find-
ing that a website with an online message board could be found liable for content posted by a third 
party). 
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them from “publishers of content” to “speakers” of such content.153 The provi-
sion provides that an ISP will not be treated as the speaker of any content on its 
site that originated from a third party.154 Tech companies and free speech advo-
cates applauded Section 230 for allowing the internet to grow without fear of 
crippling defamation lawsuits.155 Courts responded with a broad interpretation 
of Section 230 as providing a blanket immunity of sorts.156 
Because FOSTA alters the Section 230 liability shield with regards to sex 
trafficking claims, ISPs argue that they could face criminal prosecutions for 
allowing certain types of third-party content to remain on their platforms.157 
They conclude that this amounts to a violation of their First Amendment right 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that Section 230 was a congressional response to the New York state court’s ruling 
in Stratton Oakmont). The Stratton Oakmont court found that an ISP’s decision to delete certain con-
tent, but allow other content to remain, opened itself to civil liability for what remained. See 1995 WL 
323710, at *3 (noting that the common-law of torts treats publishers the same as the original speaker 
or writer in instances of defamation, whereas “distributors such as book stores and libraries” are only 
culpable if they had specific knowledge of the defamation prior to distributing to the public). 
 154 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treat-
ed as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). 
 155 See Leary, supra note 108, at 559 (arguing that Congress enacted Section 230 to foster the 
development of ISPs and tech companies); Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 2027, 2027 (2018) (arguing that the absence of Section 230 would lead websites to block free 
speech in their attempts to avoid litigation). 
 156 See BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING, supra note 13, 
at 7 (describing courts’ interpretation of Section 230 as creating “near complete criminal and civil 
immunity for ISPs” when posting third-party content). In 1997, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit held that an ISP could not be held liable for content posted by a third party. See 129 
F.3d at 330 (affirming a lower court’s ruling that AOL could not be held liable for posting a third-
party’s defamatory content regarding plaintiff Zeran). The Zeran court was the first appellate circuit 
ruling to interpret Section 230 immunity. See Suman Mirmira, Case Comment, Lunney v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 442–43 (2000). Other circuit courts have similarly agreed 
upon a broad interpretation of the protection afforded to websites from Section 230. See, e.g., Jane 
Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 18 (noting the “near-universal” conclusion that Section 230 should be inter-
preted broadly); Doe v. MySpace, Inc, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (listing courts’ broad inter-
pretation of Section 230 in cases regarding third-party generated content). In 2012, one court found 
that federal and state courts upheld Section 230’s immunity in almost all of the roughly three-hundred 
reported decisions that dealt with liability claims launched against ISPs. See Hill v. Stubhub, Inc., 727 
S.E.2d 550, 558 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that a very small minority of courts found ISPs 
liable despite their invocation of Section 230). 
 157 See The Latest Developments in Combating Online Sex Trafficking, supra note 28, at 3 (state-
ment by Eric Goldman, Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law) (arguing that FOSTA would 
force ISPs to either edit all their content or face increased liability for failing to do so). Goldman con-
cludes that this could entice ISPs to not edit at all, thus producing a result that contradicts FOSTA’s 
aims. Id.; see also Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of 
the Internet as We Know It, VOX (July 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/
fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom [https://perma.cc/K6MR-V6Y3] (noting that websites do 
not know whether they will be liable to criminal prosecution and as a result are choosing to proactive-
ly shutter their personal advertisement sections). 
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to free speech by censoring protected speech.158 In many ways, FOSTA has 
renewed the First Amendment debate between ISPs and the government that 
began when Congress passed the SAVE Act in 2015.159 At that time, critics 
feared that ISPs could face prosecution for any sex trafficking advertisements 
on their platform that they either were aware of or negligently posted.160 One 
ISP challenged the SAVE Act on the grounds that it restricted free speech and 
argued that it could be construed to sweep in the protected speech of escort 
services.161 Ultimately, the court held that the ISP lacked standing because the 
SAVE Act only applied to third-party users’ advertisements and that adver-
tisements for illegal conduct, such as sex trafficking, do not receive First 
Amendment protection.162 
By creating a new federal statute that explicitly holds ISPs responsible for 
knowingly participating in sex trafficking and prostitution, FOSTA raises the 
potential for ISPs to be prosecuted for third-party advertisements.163 In addi-
tion to federal prosecutions, ISPs are concerned about increased prosecution at 
the state level.164 ISPs also argue that the increased potential for civil litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Elliot Harmon, How Congress Censored the Internet, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/how-congress-censored-internet [https://perma.cc/
5CVR-HSJ9] (describing how FOSTA now makes ISPs liable for the speech of their users). Without 
Section 230 protection pertaining to sex trafficking, ISPs’ potential liability is no longer limited to just 
federal prosecutors. See id. (explaining how FOSTA allows for more governmental actors to pursue 
ISPs). 
 159 See SAVE Act, Pub. No. 114-22, § 2 (2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) 
(2018)) (adding advertising to the list of related sex trafficking conduct under the TVPA); Back-
page.com, LLC v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2016) (summarizing Backpage’s constitu-
tional claims against the SAVE Act). Prior to the passage of the SAVE Act in 2015, states passed 
similar laws that criminalized the advertisement of sex trafficking individuals. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 
at 100. In each instance, Backpage successfully claimed that the laws were unconstitutional on the 
grounds of “chilling protected speech” in the form of escort service advertisements. See id. (summa-
rizing the results of the state laws and Backpage’s constitutional challenges); e.g., Backpage.com, 
LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (striking down the state law for its 
infringement on protected speech of escort services advertisements). 
 160 See Sophia Cope, SAVE Act Passes in House, Comes One Step Closer to Unnecessarily Chilling 
Online Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/save-
act-passes-house-coming-one-step-closer-chilling-online-speech [https://perma.cc/Z47W-8VX6] (sum-
marizing ISPs’ fears towards the SAVE Act). 
 161 See Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (summarizing Backpage’s claim regarding First Amend-
ment violations). Backpage noted concern about its ability to continue operating its adult services 
page in fear of potential prosecution under the SAVE Act. See id. (arguing that the SAVE Act would 
force Backpage to censor its material and, as a result, might lead Backpage to shut itself down). 
 162 See id. at 110 (concluding that Backpage lacked standing to bring a constitutional claim). The 
court found that Backpage was unaffected by the SAVE Act because Backpage does not purport to 
advertise for sex trafficking and the SAVE Act only touches upon that type of conduct. See id. at 103 
(noting Backpage’s self-proclaimed purpose as providing for legal exchanges of personal services). 
 163 See Harmon, supra note 158 (describing ISPs’ fear of increased liability as a result of broader 
scope of criminal prosecutions). 
 164 See Pl. Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 9, Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, (D.D.C. July 26, 
2018) (No. 18-5298) (noting the expansion of FOSTA to include charges brought by state and local 
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by private actors amounts to a First Amendment violation because the govern-
ment is responsible for allowing potentially ruinous litigation.165 ISPs contend 
that FOSTA’s vague language could multiply the civil suits, as prosecutors and 
individuals alike can interpret the language of FOSTA differently.166 In making 
this argument, ISPs point to statutes that have forced individuals to either re-
strict their speech or face significant civil damages.167 The Supreme Court has 
held that statutes can violate the First Amendment when they inflict the harm 
of “self-censorship.”168 
2. Additional ISP Concerns 
Tech companies fear that FOSTA favors wealthier internet companies be-
cause they have the resources to fend off civil lawsuits.169 They fear that small-
                                                                                                                           
prosecutors). In Woodhull, the litigants cited fear regarding local and state prosecutors’ interpretation 
of FOSTA’s language, arguing that the prosecutors could supplant the language with their own under-
standing. See id. (explaining how FOSTA’s vague language provides no guidance to prosecutors on 
which conduct to consider criminal and, as a result, federal and state prosecutors will likely develop 
vastly different understandings of the law); see also Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(listing the litigants as two human rights organizations and one individual who all individually operate 
their own websites). 
 165 See Pl. Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 164, at 10 (describing constitutional concerns 
regarding the civil remedy). Faced with the threat of increased civil liability from FOSTA, ISPs could 
be compelled to shut down platforms that allow for their own free speech and for that of their users. 
See id. at 10–11 (emphasizing the economic consequences that could stem from increased litigation 
for ISPs). 
 166 See Br. for Inst. for Free Speech as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–9, Woodhull, 
334 F. Supp. 3d 185, (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2019) (No. 18-5298) (describing fears regarding the lack of 
clarity of FOSTA’s language). FOSTA critics worry that unclear language coupled with a broadening 
scope of potential plaintiffs will lead to huge increases in civil litigation because there will not be a 
uniform interpretation of the language. Id. 
 167 See id. at 2 (citing to instances where civil remedies were found to have “chilling” effects on 
speech). In Bland v. Fessler, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an individual had standing 
to bring a First Amendment claim against a civil statute. 88 F.3d 729, 737 (9th Cir. 1996). There, an 
individual claimed that a California civil statute violated his First Amendment rights by requiring that 
he and his business comply with certain regulations regarding automated phone calls or face civil 
fines. Id. at 731. The court ultimately held that the individual could proceed with a constitutional 
claim against the civil statute. Id. at 739. The Woodhull litigants analogize their situation to that of 
Bland, finding that they must choose between the restriction of their free speech or face civil litiga-
tion. See Pl. Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 164, at 10 (citing Bland, 88 F.3d at 737). 
 168 See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (allowing for a litigant to 
meet standing requirements on their claim for a First Amendment violation). In American Booksellers 
Ass’n, the Court held that litigants can claim that a statute violates the First Amendment if it poses the 
effect of “self-censorship.” See id. (explaining that a statute can violate the First Amendment even if 
the form of the violation does not result from government intervention). 
 169 See Schecter & Romero, supra note 137 (noting that smaller tech companies fear they lack the 
resources to review user-generated content and thus might be forced to close their user-generated 
platforms). The tech industry fears that start-up ventures will be forced to increase the size of their 
legal teams and enlarge their budgets for policing user-generated content, if they choose to keep their 
user-generated platforms. See id. (noting that the failure to take proactive measures could result in 
crippling civil or criminal lawsuits). 
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er websites, ranging from lesser-known dating sites to non-profits that advo-
cate for sex trafficked victims, will have to close for fear of increased liabil-
ity.170 This fear materialized when Craigslist, a large online platform, closed its 
personal ads section in response to the passage of FOSTA.171 Smaller compa-
nies feared that if larger companies like Craigslist could not face the increased 
liability, then they could not either.172 
In addition to First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment has been invoked 
as an additional constitutional challenge to FOSTA.173 Specifically, they point 
to FOSTA’s amendment of the crime of sex trafficking to extend civil and 
criminal liability to ISPs that post content “with the intent to promote or facili-
tate the prostitution of another person.”174 Critics’ claims here are two-fold: 
first, that the language “promote or facilitate” is too broad and, second, that the 
law incorrectly conflates prostitution with sex trafficking.175 Moreover, critics 
argue that FOSTA regulates the content of speech and that its broad language 
runs afoul of the applicable strict scrutiny test.176 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Joe Mullin, House Vote on FOSTA Is a Vote for Censorship, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/house-vote-fosta-win-censorship [https://perma.
cc/FGC8-CMAF] (naming non-profits’ and community groups’ websites as two types of ISPs that 
lack the financial resources to consistently screen user-generated content); Schecter & Romero, supra 
note 137 (noting that larger ISPs are better equipped to quickly make changes that would follow 
FOSTA’s standard of liability). Moreover, Mullin argues that this is an ironic consequence because it 
is these same smaller websites that often provide victim-centered resources to sex trafficked victims. 
See id. (claiming that FOSTA is forcing the closure of any website that utilizes language pertaining to 
sex trafficking, including those websites that provide services to victims). 
 171 See Tiku, supra note 20 (noting Craigslist’s decision to remove its personal ads section and 
announcing that exposure to such liability could endanger their other online services). 
 172 See id. (noting that the smaller tech industry generally opposed FOSTA whereas larger tech 
companies supported it). 
 173 See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (claiming that FOSTA violates the Fifth Amendment 
with regards to its overbreadth and lack of clear language); Mackey & Harmon, supra note 138 
(same). 
 174 See FOSTA, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 3, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) (“Whoever . . . owns, manages, or operates an interactive 
computer service . . . with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.”); Mackey & Harmon, supra 
note 138 (arguing that FOSTA’s over-inclusive scope extends to individuals engaging in legal con-
duct, such as those who use the internet to argue in favor of ending the crime of prostitution). 
 175 See Alex F. Levy, Why FOSTA’s Restriction on Prostitution Promotion Violates the First 
Amendment, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/
03/why-fostas-restriction-on-prostitution-promotion-violates-the-first-amendment-guest-blog-post.
htm [https://perma.cc/2ZWS-TKHS] (concluding that FOSTA connects prostitution to sex trafficking 
without any evidence that supports such a relationship). Levy points out that there is no comprehen-
sive data that prove a decline in prostitution will lead to a decline in sex trafficking. See id. (arguing 
that FOSTA’s criminalization of the facilitation of online prostitution has little to do with the issue of 
online sex trafficking). 
 176 See id. (noting that any governmental law that regulates the content of an individual’s speech 
must meet a strict scrutiny test by showing that the law is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
government interest). Levy argues that FOSTA is not narrowly tailored because it criminalizes other-
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3. Individual Users’ Complaints 
In making their First Amendment claim, critics also argue that FOSTA’s 
language is overly broad and sweeps in users’ legally protected free speech.177 
In doing so, FOSTA allegedly criminalizes the ISPs that allow for individuals 
to use the internet, in any capacity, to speak about consensual commercial 
sex.178 Referring to ISPs that have closed certain forums on their websites, 
third-party users argue that the law reduces their ability to exercise free 
speech.179 For some individuals, like sex workers, this lack of free speech pos-
es the potential for serious bodily consequences.180 
Unlike sex trafficked victims, sex workers enter into commercial sexual 
transactions by their own volition.181 By extending liability to websites that 
facilitate prostitution, FOSTA led to the closure of the online classified ad sec-
tions that allowed them to market their services.182 This has forced many sex 
workers to sell their services back out on the street, a more dangerous and less 
profitable way of doing business.183 They conclude that this is far more dan-
gerous because it removes their power of choice with regards to clients.184 
Without the existence of certain online forums, sex workers are also facing 
                                                                                                                           
wise legal speech. Id. For example, Levy notes that a website focused on providing “harm reduction 
methods” could be charged with promoting prostitution, an act criminalized by FOSTA. Id. 
 177 See id. (faulting FOSTA on the grounds that it is overly broad). 
 178 See Nash Jenkins, A New Bill Aims to Fight Sex Trafficking, but Critics Say It Goes Too Far, 
TIME (Mar. 27, 2018), http://time.com/5217280/sex-trafficking-fosta-craigstlist-reddit/ [https://perma.
cc/ZD9P-3HZV] (listing websites that provide resources to sex workers and websites that connect 
individuals with obscure sexual preferences as two of the many kinds of ISPs pulled into the broad 
reach of FOSTA). 
 179 See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (providing a Craigslist user’s claim that FOSTA has 
damaged the user’s advertising capabilities). In Woodhull, one of the litigants used Craigslist to adver-
tise for his osteopathic work. See id. (noting that the majority of litigant’s clients found him through 
his Craigslist advertisement). The litigant claims that Craigslist has removed his business advertise-
ments in response to FOSTA and that, as a result, the litigant can no longer use online marketing for 
his services. See id. 
 180 See Zimmerman, supra note 141 (providing interviews with sex workers who explain their 
fears towards returning to the traditional street corner). 
 181 See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON STATE OBLIGATIONS TO RE-
SPECT, PROTECT AND FULFILL THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS 15 (2016), https://www.
amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL3040622016ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/PF7Z-C2L6] 
(explaining that ongoing consent distinguishes sex work from sex trafficking). 
 182 See Jenkins, supra note 178 (finding that FOSTA’s broad language could extend liability to 
any website that includes mention of the consensual sexual transactions). 
 183 See Siouxsie Q, Anti-Sex-Trafficking Advocates Say New Law Cripples Efforts to Save Vic-
tims, ROLLING STONE (May 25, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/anti-
sex-trafficking-advocates-say-new-law-cripples-efforts-to-save-victims-629081/ [https://perma.cc/
55SZ-ATD8] [hereinafter Anti-Sex-Trafficking Advocates] (finding that FOSTA’s effect on websites 
has effectively pushed sex workers to offline markets). 
 184 See id. (relaying interviews with sex workers in which they admit to taking more dangerous 
jobs on the street because they are unable to screen their patrons online beforehand). 
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difficulties in communicating with one another and sharing information per-
taining to safer transactions.185 
Sex workers celebrated the emergence of the internet, including websites 
such as Backpage and Craigslist, because it improved their safety and quality 
of life.186 In their opinion, the internet allowed them to pursue work inde-
pendently of pimps, whereas now some must turn to pimps in order to find 
enough business.187 Sex workers believe that FOSTA falsely conflates prostitu-
tion with sex trafficking.188 They, like the constitutional critics, argue that 
FOSTA is overly broad and sweeps in conduct far beyond its original aim of 
sex trafficking.189 Sex workers also argue that the law wrongly punishes online 
speech pertaining to prostitution in jurisdictions where prostitution is legal, 
such as Nevada.190 
B. Proponents of FOSTA 
Proponents of FOSTA celebrate its extension of civil and criminal liabil-
ity to websites that knowingly promote sex trafficking.191 Legislators believe 
that FOSTA saves Section 230 from being improperly used as a liability shield 
in civil suits.192 They argue that the judicial interpretation of Section 230 as a 
broad liability shield strayed from Section 230’s legislative purpose of encour-
                                                                                                                           
 185 See id. (noting that sex workers previously shared safety strategies online with one another via 
private message boards that have since closed in the wake of FOSTA). 
 186 See Dias, supra note 32 (naming Craigslist and Backpage as two popular websites that sex 
workers credited for enhancing their agency). 
 187 See Shawn Setaro, Is the War on Sex Work the New War on Drugs?, COMPLEX, (July 24, 
2018), https://www.complex.com/life/2018/07/war-on-sex-work-new-war-on-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/
T6RN-PBER] (noting that sex traffickers are reaching out to sex workers and successfully persuading 
them that they must find clients through the traffickers or else face a loss of business). 
 188 See Michael Andor Brodeur, Grindr, Craigslist, and the Virtual Erosion of LGBTQ Turf, BOS. 
GLOBE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2018/04/05/grindr-craigslist-and-virtual-
erosion-lgbtq-turf/twBW8hELJ35nHmAa6P20gL/story.html [https://perma.cc/YT7S-M86V] (making 
a distinction between penalizing the perpetrators of sex trafficking from making sex workers’ lives 
more dangerous); Levy, supra note 175 (arguing that FOSTA rests on the notion that sex trafficking 
and prostitution are the same). 
 189 See Levy, supra note 175 (concluding that FOSTA is too broad in its inclusion of prostitu-
tion). 
 190 See Romano, supra note 157 (concluding the broad reach of FOSTA goes too far when crimi-
nalizing online speech regarding legal prostitution in Nevada). 
 191 See Amanda Arnold, Here’s What’s Wrong with the So-Called Anti-Trafficking Bill, THE CUT, 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/03/sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-bill-fosta.html [https://
perma.cc/FR8W-8NGK] (listing the wide support for FOSTA from both political parties in Congress, 
anti-trafficking advocacy groups, and well-known Hollywood stars). 
 192 See 164 CONG. REC. H1319-01 (quoting Representative Paulsen as blaming websites’ contin-
ued use of Section 230 as contributing to the growth of sex trafficking advertisements on the internet); 
Emily Stewart, The Next Big Battle Over Internet Freedom Is Here, VOX (Apr. 23, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/23/17237640/fosta-sesta-section-230-internet-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/67R9-YGYW] (providing the viewpoint that FOSTA will have little effect beyond 
websites that were improperly using Section 230 to disguise their participation in sex trafficking). 
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aging ISPs to moderate content.193 Advocates hope that the civil remedy provi-
sion for ISPs will allow victims to sue websites and recover damages that ade-
quately reflect the harm caused by the online advertisements.194 With regards 
to criminal prosecutions, federal prosecutors hope that FOSTA’s new mens rea 
for ISPs will allow them to more easily pursue charges.195 Moreover, state and 
local prosecutors can now bring charges against ISPs without relying on feder-
al action.196 
Receiving immense legislative support, FOSTA passed Congress nearly 
unanimously and received the president’s signature within days.197 Legislators 
regarded the lack of legal consequences for websites as the reason for sex traf-
fickers’ continued use of those websites to advertise and profit from their vic-
tims.198Additionally, it received the support of larger tech companies.199 Lastly, 
victim advocacy groups hailed FOSTA as finally holding websites responsible 
for knowingly profiting from advertisements involving sex trafficked individu-
als.200 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Shea M. Rhodes et al., SESTA/FOSTA Imposes Accountability on Internet Service Provid-
ers, Remains Misinterpreted by Many, THE HILL (May 22, 2018), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/judicial/388694-sesta-fosta-imposes-accountability-on-internet-service-providers [https://perma.
cc/U9MK-U3L8] (noting that Congress never intended Section 230 to apply to third parties who post-
ed on ISPs and instead wanted Section 230 to foster a sense of responsibility among ISPs for what 
third parties posted on their platforms). 
 194 See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886) (acknowledging the common law principle 
of punitive damages in a tort case); Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
the purpose for punitive damages within the common law tort jurisprudence as it applies to the civil 
cause of action under the TVPA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(finding punitive damages appropriate to respond to abhorrent behavior that involves “some element 
of outrage similar to that usually found in crime”); The Latest Developments in Combating Online Sex 
Trafficking, supra note 28 (noting that FOSTA’s creation of a civil cause of action against bad actor 
websites forms the principal basis for much of FOSTA’s support among sex trafficking opponents). 
 195 See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Robert 
Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 27, 2018) (noting the mens rea for ISPs under 
§ 1591 that prosecutors have struggled to meet). Prosecutors previously needed to prove that websites 
“knowingly benefitted” from sex trafficking content, whereas FOSTA requires prosecutors to prove 
that websites had “the intent to promote or facilitate” sex trafficking. See supra notes 104–108 and 
accompanying text (discussing the change in mens rea standards). 
 196 See FOSTA § 3 (amending Section 230 to preclude its application to any violations of federal 
or state law). 
 197 See Sarah Mucha, Senate Approves Anti-Sex-Trafficking Bill, CNN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/politics/sex-trafficking-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9MK-U3L8] 
(noting that the Senate supported FOSTA with a 97–2 margin and the House supported it with a 388–
25 margin). 
 198 See id. (providing Senator Mitch McConnell’s characterization of FOSTA as a law that holds 
bad actor websites accountable for their role in facilitating sex trafficking). 
 199 See Kang & Stolberg, supra note 112 (finding that prominent companies in the technology 
industry, such as Google and Facebook, came to support FOSTA by the time it passed Congress). 
 200 See Rhodes et al., supra note 193 (defending FOSTA on the grounds that it only holds ISPs 
accountable for facilitating sex trafficking and refuting the notion that FOSTA reaches the conduct of 
individual sex workers). 
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT SEX  
TRAFFICKING ADVERTISEMENTS 
FOSTA does not violate the First Amendment because the Supreme Court 
does not extend First Amendment protection to speech used to solicit crimes.201 
Sex traffickers’ online advertisements of their victims promotes the crime of 
sex trafficking by seeking buyers for commercial sex acts with non-consenting 
victims.202 Congress criminalized such conduct when it passed the TVPA, pro-
hibiting the act of sex trafficking.203 FOSTA extends this criminal liability to 
ISPs that intend to promote sex trafficking as well.204 Just as sex traffickers 
lack First Amendment protection for the advertisements they put online, so too 
do ISPs that knowingly facilitate such advertisements.205 
Although the matter has not been adjudicated explicitly, recent court deci-
sions suggest that ISPs cannot claim that FOSTA violates their First Amend-
ment rights.206 When addressing whether the SAVE Act violated ISPs’ First 
Amendment rights with regards to third-party advertisements, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia emphasized that the First Amendment does 
not extend to sex trafficking advertisements.207 The court found that ISPs can-
                                                                                                                           
 201 Compare United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) (affirming the constitutionality of 
a statute that criminalizes speech used to induce illicit conduct), with David Greene, EFF Sues to Invali-
date FOSTA, an Unconstitutional Internet Censorship Law, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/eff-sues-invalidate-fosta-unconstitutional-internet-censorship-law 
[https://perma.cc/2YDL-HGM6] (alleging that FOSTA’s language extends to constitutionally permissi-
ble language). 
 202 See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 103(9), 114 Stat. 1488 (2000) (criminalizing the act of sex 
trafficking by force or of underage individuals); Kowalski, supra note 101, at 101 (attributing the 
ability of traffickers to find customers to the traffickers’ use of internet advertising). 
 203 See TVPA § 103(9) (criminalizing individuals who participate in the sale of humans for pur-
poses of commercial sexual acts). 
 204 See FOSTA, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 3, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) (creating a new federal offense that precludes ISPs from 
knowingly facilitating or participating in the act of sex trafficking). 
 205 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (affirming the lengthy history of criminal statutes that penalize 
individuals’ speech that leads to criminal conduct). The Court drew upon the longstanding criminal 
statutes that proscribed “conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation.” Id. 
 206 See, e.g., Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 201 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(rejecting the argument that FOSTA criminalizes protected speech and noting that “it is black-letter 
law” that individuals cannot claim First Amendment protection to speech that furthers crime, such as 
sex trafficking advertisements). Instead of ruling on the merits of plaintiffs’ case regarding whether 
FOSTA violated their First Amendment right, however, the court found that the plaintiffs collectively 
lacked standing. Id. at 203. 
 207 See Backpage.com, LLC v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 96, 103 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that sex 
trafficking advertisements do not receive First Amendment protection). Backpage alleged that the 
SAVE Act’s criminalization of advertisements for sex trafficking could inadvertently extend to con-
sensual sex advertisements on Backpage. See id. (arguing that it could be held in violation of the 
SAVE Act by allowing for third-party users to post advertisements regarding sex of any kind). The 
court rejected this argument, finding that the SAVE Act was solely focused on sex trafficking adver-
tisements and as such did not incorrectly criminalize other types of legal and protected speech on 
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not claim a First Amendment right to speech that never qualified for the pro-
tection of the First Amendment.208 In doing so, the court rested their decision 
on United States v. Williams and suggested that Williams extends to solicita-
tions for criminal conduct beyond that of child pornography.209 
A potential difference between the child pornography statute at issue in 
Williams and FOSTA, however, is the language used in the statutes.210 FOSTA 
critics point to § 2421A’s language of “promote or facilitate” prostitution as 
both overly broad and ambiguous.211 They claim that the broad language vio-
lates the First Amendment by applying to both illegal and legal speech.212 Sim-
ilar to the litigant in Williams, FOSTA critics argue that the language sweeps in 
constitutionally protected speech.213 FOSTA’s language differs from that of the 
child pornography statute in Williams because it has only two verbs as com-
pared to the lengthier verb phrase at issue in Williams.214 Although the Court in 
Williams noted the length of the verb phrase, it did so in order to find what the 
                                                                                                                           
Backpage’s platform. See id. (looking to both the legislative intent underlying the SAVE Act and its 
language). 
 208 See id. (rejecting Backpage’s argument that the SAVE Act applied to legal speech). 
 209 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (finding that offers to provide child pornography do not warrant 
First Amendment protection based “on the principle that offers to give or receive what is unlawful to 
possess have no social value”); Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (denying Backpage’s claim that certain 
types of speech on its website deserved First Amendment protection). 
 210 Compare Williams, 553 U.S. at 299 (describing the child pornography statute at issue), with 
FOSTA § 3 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A (2018)) (including an overview of the statuto-
ry language). 
 211 See FOSTA § 3 (stating, in relevant part, “[w]hoever . . . owns, manages, or operates an inter-
active computer service . . . with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both”); Br. of Petitioner-
Appellant at 9, Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 13, 2019) (No. 18-05298) (claiming the 
language of “promoting” and “facilitating” is unclear). 
 212 See Br. for Inst. for Free Speech as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11, Woodhull, 334 
F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2019) (No. 18-05298) (noting that websites, in response to FOSTA, 
have “ceased the discussion of topics even tangentially related to FOSTA’s intended targets” and thus 
demonstrating FOSTA’s infringement on otherwise protected speech). The Supreme Court has found 
a statute violates the First Amendment if it restricts too much legal speech. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
The Court attempts to discern between statutes that wrongfully restrain individuals from engaging in 
beneficial speech versus statutes that provide a social benefit by restricting harmful speech. See Vir-
ginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20 (2003) (explaining the danger in a law that restricts speech that 
is beneficial to society). 
 213 Compare Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (addressing the claim that the child pornography statute 
extended to legal speech), with Br. of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 211, at 21 (claiming that FOS-
TA criminalizes legal speech such as health advice and safety tips that consensual sex workers share 
with one another online). 
 214 Compare FOSTA § 3 (criminalizing those who use an ISP “to promote or facilitate the prosti-
tution of another person”), with Williams, 553 U.S. at 294 (providing the language of the statute that 
criminalized, in relevant part, an individual who “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solic-
its” child pornography). 
2506 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2475 
statute sought to prohibit (i.e. child pornography).215 In other words, the 
amount of language used in the statute was not dispositive of whether the stat-
ute was narrow enough and only applied to unprotected speech.216 Instead, the 
Supreme Court looks to whether the language demonstrates a clear intent to 
only criminalize certain types of speech and uses different factors to arrive at 
such a conclusion.217 
In Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States, the D.C. District Court 
became the first federal court to face a FOSTA constitutional challenge, but it 
did not rule on the merits of the First Amendment claim.218 Nonetheless, its 
opinion suggested that FOSTA’s language is sufficiently narrow and thus only 
reaches unprotected speech.219 The D.C. District Court looked to FOSTA’s us-
age of the verbs “promoting” and “facilitating” and phrase “prostitution of an-
other person,” seemingly satisfied that FOSTA exclusively extends to speech 
that is already considered criminal.220 Similar to the Supreme Court in Wil-
liams, the D.C. Circuit Court did not look to a single factor but instead consid-
ered whether FOSTA included various factors that successfully limited its 
scope.221 The court concluded that FOSTA only reached speech that pertained 
                                                                                                                           
 215 Williams, 553 U.S. at 294. In determining whether a statute extends to constitutionally pro-
tected speech, the Supreme Court applied a two-step analysis. Id. at 293. First, it looked to the plain 
language of the statute to understand what the statute applies to. See id. (understanding the statute at 
issue as criminalizing solicitations of child pornography). In doing so, the Court considered several 
factors, including the verbs used. See id. (looking at factors such as language of the statute, presence 
of a mens rea, and definitions used). Then, the Court determined whether the statute applies to lan-
guage that is protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 297 (finding that the statute extended to any 
language used to facilitate the exchange of child pornography). In Williams, the Court found that the 
statute was not overly broad because it specifically applied to child pornography and that such lan-
guage was not protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 299 (holding that the First Amendment 
does not protect offers to commit crime). 
 216 See id. at 293 (providing relevant factors including, but not limited to, the number of verbs 
used in a criminal statute). 
 217 See id. at 294–96 (looking to factors including, but not limited to, (1) whether the statute con-
tains a scienter requirement, (2) whether the language defining the criminal conduct is specific enough 
so that a reasonable person could understand what constitutes criminal conduct, and (3) whether the 
statute creates an objective standard to judge defendant’s conduct). 
 218 See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (dismissing the case for lack of plaintiffs’ standing). To 
address whether the plaintiffs are harmed by FOSTA, the court in Woodhull first interprets the lan-
guage of the statute to determine what speech it reaches. See id. at 199 (finding that FOSTA extends 
to ISPs who utilize their speech in a way that facilitates sex trafficking). Then, the court applies that 
interpretation to the speech at issue. See id. at 198 (holding that a website providing advice for sex 
workers does not violate FOSTA because such speech does not knowingly facilitate sex trafficking). 
 219 See id. at 201 (suggesting that FOSTA only targets speech used to further a crime and, as such, 
targets speech that does not receive First Amendment protection). 
 220 See id. at 199 (noting that FOSTA is exclusively focused on “specific unlawful acts” and re-
jecting plaintiffs’ argument that FOSTA’s language is overly broad). 
 221 Compare Williams, 553 U.S. at 294–96 (looking to factors such as whether the child pornog-
raphy statute included a mens rea, whether the language was specific enough for a reasonable person 
to understand it, and whether the statute contained an objective standard), with Woodhull, 334 F. 
Supp. 3d at 199 (concluding that FOSTA included a mens rea of knowledge and that the statute’s 
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to prostitution or sex trafficking and as such could not be misunderstood to 
extend to litigants’ protected speech.222 
As the Supreme Court held in Williams, offers to engage in illegal con-
duct do not receive First Amendment protection because they do not provide 
any societal benefit.223 Applying this reasoning to sex traffickers’ advertise-
ments of their victims, the advertisements encourage illicit conduct and thus do 
not promote First Amendment goals.224 Aside from posting images of victims 
without their permission, the advertisements create even greater societal harm 
by proffering the victims for sale.225 FOSTA clarifies that ISPs, along with sex 
traffickers themselves, cannot promote the crime of sex trafficking by using 
their online platforms to do so.226 
By holding individual actors and ISPs to the same criminal consequences 
with regards to their sex trafficking conduct, FOSTA suggests a change in the 
responsibility expected of ISPs.227 For much of the past twenty years, ISPs 
shielded themselves from liability claims with Section 230.228 Passed in 1996, 
Section 230 aimed to facilitate the growth of the internet by allowing ISPs to 
operate without the liability restraints imposed on traditional providers of in-
formation, such as newspaper publishers.229 Now, FOSTA carves out an excep-
tion in Section 230 to preclude its application to ISPs charged with knowingly 
                                                                                                                           
language provided a clear focus on the illicit conduct of sex trafficking as opposed to forms of consti-
tutionally protected speech). 
 222 See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 199 (holding that Woodhull’s concern regarding FOSTA’s 
application to speech pertaining to prostitution was unfounded). 
 223 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (emphasizing the First Amendment’s promotion of societally 
beneficial ideas); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–
64 (1980) (holding that the government can prohibit speech that pertains to criminal conduct without 
running afoul of First Amendment violations). 
 224 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298 (finding that speech that is harmful to society does not receive 
First Amendment protection); URBAN INST., supra note 17, at 192 (describing how sex traffickers 
profit more from online classified advertisements than other avenues). 
 225 See Nanos, supra note 1 (describing how the continued existence of a victim’s advertisement 
online, even after her assault, further contributed to her traumatic experience). 
 226 See 18 U.S.C. § 2421A (creating a new federal offense that precludes ISPs from knowingly 
facilitating or participating in the act of sex trafficking). 
 227 See Joshua A. Geltzer, The President and Congress Are Thinking of Changing This Important 
Internet Law, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/cda-section-230-trump-
congress.html [https://perma.cc/ZK5M-KLGP] (finding that Section 230 has been misunderstood 
from its original legislative purpose as an immunity shield). Geltzer argues that Section 230 was en-
acted to encourage ISPs to develop innovative ways of dealing with negative content, without fear of 
being dragged down in liability claims. See id. Geltzer concludes that the issue is whether ISPs actual-
ly responded to the congressional expectation embedded in Section 230. See id. 
 228 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (describing the 
breadth with which courts interpreted Section 230’s immunity shield). 
 229 See S. REP. NO. 104-23, 1 (1995) (explaining that the purpose of the CDA is to create a “pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework” in the newly emerging internet era). 
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promoting sex trafficking.230 Perhaps critics fear any change to Section 230, 
regardless of the reason behind the change, as the ultimate reason to criticize 
FOSTA.231 
Despite the legislative success of FOSTA, the willingness of victims and 
prosecutors to utilize FOSTA is beyond the control of Congress.232 Since FOS-
TA passed, there has not been a dramatic increase in civil litigation from sex 
trafficking victims.233 Data suggest that sex traffickers are shifting their adver-
tisements from larger sites to smaller sites without legal consequences.234 The 
lack of civil litigation towards ISPs and traffickers’ shift to smaller websites 
could encourage law enforcement to pursue a seizure strategy akin to their ac-
tion towards Backpage in 2018 if FOSTA proves to be ineffective at shrinking 
sex trafficking’s illicit marketplace.235 Nonetheless, the law contributes signifi-
cantly to an increasing realm of legislation aimed at holding sex trafficking 
perpetrators accountable.236 Although this change may seem drastic to FOSTA 
critics, a First Amendment analysis of the law demonstrates that it merely adds 
ISPs to the pre-existing category of sex traffickers and beneficiaries who can-
                                                                                                                           
 230 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (explicitly providing that Section 230 cannot be used in any civil or 
criminal charge involving sex trafficking). 
 231 See Geltzer, supra note 227 (describing Section 230 supporters’ fear towards any amendment 
whatsoever). 
 232 See Nam, supra note 88, at 1668 (providing data regarding the lack of victims’ usage of the 
TVPA’s civil remedy in the four years since it had been enacted in 2003). 
 233 See LEVY, supra note 30, at 15 (noting that only 8% of all civil cases brought from human 
trafficking claims relate to sex trafficking specifically). 
 234 See Press Release, Marinus Analytics, Marinus Analytics Finds Sex Trafficking Surging 
Online After Backpage.com Shutdown (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.marinusanalytics.com/articles/
2018/11/1/current-us-escort-ad-activity-has-surpassed-the-volume-we-saw-on-backpage-before-the-
shutdown [https://perma.cc/M4Q6-FJC5] (noting an increase in third-party user activity on websites 
providing personal classified advertisements). Nonetheless, some warn that the increase in advertise-
ments is due to traffickers placing the same advertisement on multiple websites to recuperate the loss 
from Backpage’s larger audience. Contra Ryan Tarinelli, Online Sex Ads Rebound, Months After 
Shutdown of Backpage, NBC N.Y. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-
international/Backpage-Down-Online-Sex-Ads-Rebound—501487242.html [https://perma.cc/D4MN-
FR5M] (rejecting the notion that Backpage’s closure led to an increase in unique sex trafficking ad-
vertisements). 
 235 See Press Release, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Leads Effort to Seize Back-
page.com, the Internet’s Leading Forum for Prostitution Ads, and Obtains 93-Count Federal Indict-
ment (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-leads-effort-seize-backpage
com-internet-s-leading-forum-prostitution-ads [https://perma.cc/FL7K-XPUB] (explaining the federal 
government’s seizure of Backpage). The Justice Department, joined by other federal and state law 
enforcement agencies, seized Backpage due to its violation of prostitution facilitation charges. Id. This 
action occurred days before FOSTA’s passage. See Dias, supra note 32 (providing FOSTA’s passage 
date as April 11, 2018). 
 236 See TVPA § 102(b)(13)–(14) (noting the need for specific legislation to combat sex traffick-
ing). 
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not disguise sex trafficking advertisements as an exercise of their free 
speech.237 
CONCLUSION 
Since the growth of the internet, sex traffickers have used online adver-
tisements of their victims to find customers willing to pay for their victims’ 
commercial sex acts. In an expanding realm of liability for the crime of sex 
trafficking, FOSTA acts as the most recent step to limit the scope of its grow-
ing marketplace. Starting in 2000 with the TVPA, Congress acknowledged sex 
trafficking as its own specific crime. Subsequently, individuals have been held 
responsible for their role in perpetuating it, whether they were sex traffickers, 
beneficiaries, or conspirators. FOSTA brings sex trafficking law into the twen-
ty-first century by acknowledging the prominent role that the online market-
place plays in sex trafficking. FOSTA is an essential legislative development 
because it holds websites responsible for willfully promoting sex trafficking. 
The blanket internet immunity of the past can no longer be used as a shield to 
protect bad actors’ criminal conduct. Website providers that facilitate sex traf-
ficking should face the same consequences as traffickers themselves—and 
FOSTA ensures this result. 
ABIGAIL W. BALFOUR 
                                                                                                                           
 237 See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 201 (affirming that there is no First Amendment protection 
for speech that promotes illegal conduct). 
  
 
